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The Drones Are Coming! 
WILL THE FOURTH AMENDMENT STOP THEIR 
THREAT TO OUR PRIVACY? 
Robert Molko† 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the use of drones in military operations 
has become very public. But what is not as well known is that 
local law enforcement agencies are now using drones1 and plan 
to expand their use to conduct surveillance of communities for 
criminal activity.2  
Today, in the twenty-first century, our privacy seems to 
have been eroded virtually to the point of nonexistence.3 We 
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 1 “In five days, the Unmanned Applications Institute International can teach a cop 
how to use a drone the size of a bathtub toy.” Mark Brunswick, Spies in the Sky Signal New 
Age of Surveillance, STAR TRIB. (July 22, 2012, 6:26 AM), http://www.startribune.com/ 
local/163304886.html?refer=y. “The University of North Dakota operates a fleet of seven 
different types of [drones].” Id. It “offer[s] a four-year degree in unmanned aircraft piloting.” Id.  
 2 See Catherine Herridge, Government Plans for Drastic Expansion of 
Domestic Mini-Drones, FOXNEWS.COM (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/ 
politics/2013/02/23/government-plans-for-drastic-expansion-domestic-mini-drones/; see 
also David Pierce, Mayor Bloomberg Says Surveillance Drones Are Inevitable in NYC: 
“Get Used to It,” THEVERGE (Mar. 24, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/3/ 
24/4141526/mayor-bloomberg-says-surveillance-drones-inevitable-in-nyc; Carl Franzen, 
Privacy Laws Can’t Handle New Wave of Commercial Drones, Senate Hearing 
Concludes, THEVERGE (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/3/20/4127988/ 
senate-worried-drones-for-commercial-police-violate-privacy/in/3759737. 
 3 Advances in technology have been blamed for a lot of this loss of privacy. 
On the other hand, as Professor Simmons points out, technology has also enhanced 
privacy in our everyday lives, allowing us to communicate more privately (e.g., cell 
phones, emails, text messages, anonymizers), store data more privately (“cloud” remote 
electronic storage, encryption), and conduct a greater number of activities within the 
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have already lost substantial privacy in our cars, our cell 
phones, our business records, our bodies, and even in our 
homes.4 And now, law enforcement’s adoption of drones 
threatens to further erode our right to privacy as they silently 
hover over our neighborhoods and monitor our every move. Will 
the U.S. Supreme Court and the Fourth Amendment stop this 
impending threat to our privacy? 
The Fourth Amendment protects us from unreasonable 
intrusions by the government, and we have come to depend on 
that protection.5 Over the years, we have learned to cherish our 
privacy and shield it not only from governmental intrusion but 
also from everyone else if we so choose. Our privacy arguably 
represents our most cherished “possession.”6 For more than 
forty years, courts have used the Katz “reasonable expectation 
of privacy”7 test to determine whether government conduct is 
constitutional. Both courts and scholars, however, have highly 
criticized this test when applied to advancing technology.8 Yet, 
the test still survives, and as this article will demonstrate, it 
will continue to survive as the applicable test of 
  
privacy of our homes in the computer age. See Ric Simmons, Why 2007 Is Not Like 
1984: A Broader Perspective on Technology’s Effect on Privacy and Fourth Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 531, 535-36 (2007).  
 4 We have lost most of our privacy to warrantless governmental intrusions 
due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s creation of numerous exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment’s search warrant requirement. These exceptions continue to grow and 
expand all the time. This trend seems unstoppable. The Court has also found that 
many of the governmental intrusions are “reasonable” and therefore not in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, we have been subject to far worse 
intrusions by private individuals that are not governed by the Fourth Amendment 
(e.g., compromises of databases, hackers, insiders).  
 5 The U.S. Constitution does not explicitly delineate a right of privacy. 
Rather, it has been implied from the protections for “persons, houses, papers, and 
effects” under the Fourth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In 1965, the Court 
developed a separate basis of privacy out of what it called “penumbras, formed by 
emanations from [the Bill of Rights’] guarantees that help give them life and 
substance.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). Moreover, the Court has 
indicated that one aspect of the “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is “a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or 
zones of privacy.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). This latter concept of privacy is 
primarily used in relation to the right to abortion and issues involving consensual acts by 
adults in their own home. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
 6 As Justice Brandeis described it, the right of privacy is the “right to be let 
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
 7 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” test was initially proposed by Justice Harlan in his Katz concurrence. Id. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring). However, it was adopted by the Court in subsequent decisions 
and has since been referred to as the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy. See Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986). 
 8 See infra Part II. 
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constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment in drone 
surveillance cases. Nevertheless, the test’s continued use is not 
necessarily a foregone conclusion, as the Supreme Court may 
yet alter its manner of application. 
Over the years, courts have permitted aerial 
surveillance from navigable airspace where civilian planes or 
helicopters routinely fly,9 although they have prohibited such 
surveillance if it occurred from unusually low altitudes.10 
Today, however, advances in surveillance and optics technology 
have made it possible to detect very small objects from high 
altitudes.11 In addition to these advances, stealth technology12 
enables drones to hover above us, silently monitoring 
everything we do in areas exposed to the sky.13 Drone 
technology, when carried to its extreme, threatens to destroy 
whatever vestiges of privacy remain in modern society, even in 
areas like a secluded, fenced-in backyard or private estate. 
Many local law enforcement agencies have already 
begun implementing these aerial surveillance technologies. For 
example, the city of Lancaster, California recently began using 
aerial surveillance to monitor the city’s neighborhoods.14 There, 
a plane will fly above the city for up to ten hours a day.15 
“Drones are [also] being considered by [San Francisco] Bay 
Area law enforcement agencies as a cost-cutting way to replace 
helicopters . . . and use technology to fight crime and save 
lives.”16 Moreover, North Dakota police recently used a drone to 
monitor activity on a ranch to determine when its occupants 
would be unarmed in order to avoid a violent shootout when 
  
 9 See generally Florida v. Riley, 490 U.S. 1014 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 
476 U.S. 207 (1986), discussed in detail in Part III. 
 10 See Pew v. Scopino, 904 F. Supp. 18, 27 (D. Me. 1995). 
 11 See, e.g., infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.  
 12 See, e.g., infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.  
 13 George Orwell saw it before any of us. “In the far distance a helicopter 
skimmed down between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a blue-bottle, and darted 
away again with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping into people’s 
windows.” GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 2 (1949). 
 14 Abby Sewell et al., Lancaster Takes to the Skies to Get a View on Crime, 
L.A. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/25/local/la-me-0825-
lancaster-aircraft-20120825. The plane is equipped with a video camera. Id. This 
program is the equivalent of drone surveillance for the purpose of Fourth Amendment 
analysis because the plane’s civilian pilot cannot see the encrypted video that is fed 
down to the police dispatch center. See id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Stephanie Chuang, Bay Area Law Enforcement Agencies Test Drones, 
NBCBAYAREA.COM (Feb. 14, 2013, 2:53 PM), http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/ 
Bay-Area-Law-Enforcement-Agencies-Test-Drones-173415551.html. 
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apprehending the suspects.17 Police in Gadsden, Alabama, 
bought “a lightweight drone . . . to help in drug investigations.”18 
Authorities in Tampa Bay, Florida, considered using drones for 
security surveillance at the 2012 Republican National 
Convention.19 The Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office in Texas 
has even considered arming a drone with rubber bullets and 
tear gas.20 These represent only a small sampling of local law 
enforcement agencies that have begun to use drones.21  
At the same time, two private software companies, 
Apple and Google, used aerial surveillance and military-grade 
cameras in a race to create detailed, three-dimensional images 
of city and residential streets throughout the world.22 These 
cameras are so powerful that “they can show objects just four 
inches wide” and “potentially see into homes through skylights 
and windows.”23 Apple’s rush to outdo Google led to its 
catastrophic premature release of three-dimensional visual 
flyovers in Apple Maps in September 2012, which it has been 
trying to correct ever since.24 
  
 17 Brian Bennett, Police Employ Predator Drone Spy Planes on Home Front, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/dec/10/nation/la-na-drone-
arrest-20111211. On August 1, 2012, a North Dakota District Judge held that this 
drone surveillance was lawful. See Jason Koebler, Court Upholds Domestic Drone Use in 
Arrest of American Citizen, USNEWS.COM (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/ 
news/articles/2012/08/02/court-upholds-domestic-drone-use-in-arrest-of-american-citizen.  
 18 Brian Bennett, Police Departments Wait for FAA Clearance to Fly Drones, 
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/29/nation/la-na-drone-
faa-20120430. 
 19 W.J. Hennigan, Idea of Civilians Using Drone Aircraft May Soon Fly with 
FAA, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/27/business/la-fi-
drones-for-profit-20111127. 
 20 Groups Concerned Over Arming of Domestic Drones, CBS DC (May 23, 
2012, 1:18 PM), http://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/05/23/groups-concerned-over-
arming-of-domestic-drones [hereinafter CBS DC]. 
 21 In April 2012, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) released a list of 
police departments that have been issued Certificates of Authorizations (COAs) to fly 
drones domestically. See FAA List of Certificates of Authorizations (COAs), ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/document/faa-list-certificates-authorizations-
coas (last visited Feb. 8, 2013). Those departments include, among others, the FBI and 
local law enforcement agencies in Orange County; Miami-Dade; North Little Rock, 
Arkansas; Houston, Texas; Arlington, Texas; Seattle, Washington; Gadsden, Alabama; 
Georgia Tech; Ogden, Utah; and small cities and counties like Otter Tail, Minnesota, 
and Herington, Kansas. Id. 
 22 Vanessa Allen, Beware the Spy in the Sky: After Those Street View Snoopers, 
Google and Apple Use Planes that Can Film You Sunbathing in Your Back Garden, MAIL 
ONLINE (June 10, 2012, 7:04 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/ 
article-2157150/Google-Apple-use-planes-film-sunbathing-garden.html. 
 23 Id.  
 24 See Kyle Wagner, Apple’s New 3D Maps Are an Apocalyptic Horror Show, 
GIZMODO.COM (Sept. 19, 2012, 4:19 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5944672/apples-new-3d-
maps-turn-your-world-into-an-apocalyptic-horror-show; Apple Improving 3D Flyover 
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On the legislative side, on February 14, 2012, President 
Obama signed into law the FAA Modernization and Reform Act 
of 2012.25 This law requires the FAA to expedite the process of 
authorizing both public and private use of drones in the 
national navigable airspace.26 This statutory mandate will 
inevitably reduce our privacy through increased aerial surveillance 
of neighborhoods and public places by law enforcement drones, 
bringing us ever closer to an Orwellian state.27 Indeed, “[t]he 
government has predicted that as many as 30,000 drones will be 
flying over U.S. skies by the end of the decade.”28 Some experts 
predict that those drones will be used by “journalists, police 
departments, disaster rescue teams, scientists, real estate 
agents, and private citizens.”29 
In the past, the constitutionality of aerial surveillance 
has begun with the proposition that a person cannot have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy for matters left exposed to 
the public.30 However, there must be some meaningful limit on 
how far overhead surveillance of our neighborhoods can stretch 
before the invasion of privacy reaches constitutional 
proportions. Accordingly, the increasing prevalence of drone 
surveillance may provide the right impetus for the Supreme 
Court to draw such a limit, whether under its current 
“reasonable expectation” jurisprudence or perhaps under a 
different framework altogether. 
In any event, the Court would have to consider the issue 
of drone surveillance in the context of United States v. Jones, 
which reviewed the constitutionality of using GPS to monitor 
the location of cars in public.31 Dicta in Jones indicate that 
although none of the Justices would be willing to abandon the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test, some of them may 
decide to adopt a different approach in applying it in certain 
  
Visuals in iOS 6 Maps, APPLEINSIDER.COM (Oct. 5, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://appleinsider.com/ 
articles/12/10/05/apple-improving-3d-flyover-visuals-in-ios-6-maps. 
 25 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11. 
 26 See S. Smithson, Drones Over U.S. Get OK by Congress, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 
7, 2012), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/7/coming-to-a-sky-near-you/. 
 27 The “Orwellian state” refers to the surveillance state that George Orwell 
depicted in his novel, 1984. See generally ORWELL, supra note 13. 
 28 Brunswick, supra note 1. “Where aviation was in 1925, that’s where we are today 
with unmanned aerial vehicles . . . . The possibilities are endless.” Id. (quoting Al Palmer, Dir., 
Univ. of N.D. Ctr. for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Research, Educ. & Training). 
 29 Jason Koebler, The Coming Drone Revolution: What You Should Know, 
USNEWS.COM (Apr. 5, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/04/05/the-
coming-drone-revolution-what-you-should-know. 
 30 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 31 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).  
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contexts in the future. In particular, as discussed below in Part 
IV, many of the Justices seem very concerned about warrantless 
governmental monitoring of persons in their day-to-day 
activities and appear willing to limit the extent of such law 
enforcement activity. 
This article explores the ramifications of the Jones 
decision and its dicta suggesting that Fourth Amendment 
limitations could apply in the future in the context of drone 
surveillance of our neighborhoods. Importantly, while the 
Court’s previous jurisprudence has primarily considered the 
nature of police observations, Jones provides insight for the first 
time on the permissible duration32 of such observations.33 At the 
same time, however, because Jones focused only on monitoring 
activities occurring in public places, it provides only minimal 
insight on the issue of drone surveillance of the home or curtilage.34 
To bridge that gap, this article will also consider Supreme Court 
jurisprudence related to surveillance of those two areas. 
Part I will introduce the FAA Modernization and 
Reform Act of 2012 and offer a discussion of the nature of 
current drone technology and how such technology could be 
used by law enforcement. Part II will provide a short overview 
of the manner in which the Fourth Amendment protects 
individuals from unreasonable governmental intrusion.35 Part 
III will explore the scope of aerial surveillance and the use of 
other technologies that the Supreme Court has previously 
allowed under the Fourth Amendment. Part IV will analyze 
Jones and assess what the Justices’ various opinions may 
foretell for the Fourth Amendment fate of drone technology 
surveillance. Finally, Part V will explore how the Court might 
apply the Jones rationales and current Fourth Amendment 
  
 32 The observations of the defendant’s car in Jones lasted 24/7 for twenty-
eight days. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946; see also discussion infra Part IV.  
 33 Previous jurisprudence focused on the type of observation (e.g., naked eye, 
photography, binoculars, or infrared technology). See discussion infra Part III. 
 34 Jones does provide some indirect insight as to drone surveillance of the 
home and curtilage because the courts have traditionally held that the Fourth 
Amendment offers greater protection against the invasion of privacy in those areas 
than in public places. See discussion infra Part IV. Accordingly, if the Fourth 
Amendment would preclude some drone surveillance in public places, it would follow 
that similar protection would extend to the curtilage and the home. 
 35 The issue of other potential constitutional rights violations, such as the 
First Amendment freedom of assembly, is a separate issue that is beyond the scope of 
this article. The issue of public safety related to possible collisions of drones with 
passenger planes or possible crashes to the ground of a drone is also beyond this 
article’s scope. See, e.g., Chris Lawrence, Navy Drone Crashes in Maryland, CNN 
(June 11, 2012, 6:51 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/11/us/maryland-drone-crash/ 
index.html?hpt=hp%20t2t (discussing a recent drone accident).  
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jurisprudence in the context of the inevitable drone invasion of 
our neighborhoods. 
I. CURRENT DRONE TECHNOLOGY AND THE FAA 
MODERNIZATION AND REFORM ACT OF 2012 
A brief preview of drone technology and recent 
legislation authorizing the use of drones will provide necessary 
context before considering the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to drone surveillance. Drones come in many 
shapes and sizes, ranging from as large as a commercial 
airplane36 to as small as a hummingbird,37 and many cost less 
than a helicopter.38 Some drones’ small size and light weight 
enable them to fit in the trunk of a car, and many are designed 
to be hand-launched by one person.39 The following examples of 
existing drones provide some perspective on the breadth and 
adaptability of drone technology that law enforcement can use 
to conduct aerial surveillance: 
• The pocketsize Nano Hummingbird has a wingspan of 6.5 inches, 
weighs 19 grams, and is equipped with a video camera.40  
• The Wasp Micro Air Vehicle has a wingspan of 2.4 feet, a length 
of 1.25 feet, and weighs 0.95 pounds.41  
• The Wasp AE has a wingspan of 3.3 feet, a length of 2.5 feet, 
weighs 2.85 pounds, and is designed to be hand-launched.42  
  
 36 See W.J. Hennigan, Air Force Buys Souped-Up, Stealthy Version of Predator 
Drone, L.A. TIMES BLOG (Dec. 31, 2011, 10:19 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/ 
money_co/2011/12/drone-general-atomics-air-force-.html. 
 37 See W.J. Hennigan, It’s a Bird! It’s a Spy! It’s Both, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 
2011, at B1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/17/business/la-fi-
hummingbird-drone-20110217 (describing the development by AeroVironment Inc. of 
the “Nano Hummingbird”). 
 38 A police helicopter can cost $1.7 million, whereas a Qube drone only costs 
$40,000. See Hennigan, supra note 19. 
 39 See discussion infra notes 40-44. One can imagine two different uses for 
police drones: (1) a small drone in the trunk of a patrol car to be used by an unassisted 
officer for unplanned short periods of surveillance; and (2) a larger drone that can 
hover for long periods of time for a more complex planned surveillance.  
 40 Hennigan, supra note 37. It is able to fly at speeds of up to eleven miles per 
hour and “can hover and fly sideways, backward and forward, as well as go clockwise 
and counterclockwise.” Id. 
 41 Wasp III, AV AEROVIRONMENT, www.avinc.com/downloads/WASP-
III_datasheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). The WASP Micro Air Vehicle has an 
operating altitude range from 50 to 1,000 feet. The WASP includes “live video 
downlink, self tracking, still photography and nighttime IR technology.” It can be 
operated manually but is also capable of “GPS-based autonomous flight and 
navigation.” Id.; see also Jennifer Lynch, Texas Cancels Its Drone Program for 
Maintenance Issues, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 24, 2012), https://www.eff.org/ 
deeplinks/2012/01/texas-department-public-safety-cancels-its-drone-program. 
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• The Raven has a wingspan of 4.5 feet, weighs 4.2 pounds, and is 
designed to be hand-launched.43  
• The Qube weighs 5.5 pounds and can fit in the trunk of a car.44 
• The Boeing ScanEagle can fly at speeds of 139 kilometers per 
hour for up to 20 hours.45  
• The A160T Hummingbird is a large, 35-foot-long drone that can 
takeoff or land vertically and hover for 20 hours at 15,000 feet.46 
Due to their design, drones can carry various 
instruments that allow them to conduct stealth aerial 
surveillance for varying periods of time. For example, they can 
be equipped with still and video cameras, infrared cameras, heat 
sensors, and radar.47 Drones can also carry tear gas or weapons.48 
In addition to conducting visual surveillance, drones have the 
electronic surveillance capability of using sophisticated 
instruments to measure infrared radiation emanating from 
houses, eavesdrop on cell-phone conversations and text messages 
by impersonating cell-phone towers, and spy on Wi-Fi networks 
through automated password cracking.49 This article, however, 
focuses strictly on visual aerial surveillance.50 In this context, 
  
 42 Wasp AE, AV AEROVIRONMENT, www.avinc.com/downloads/WaspAE.pdf 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2013). The WASP AE can fly at an altitude of 500 feet for 50 
minutes. Id. It can be packed and carried by one person and is designed to be very 
quiet in order to avoid detection. Id.  
 43 U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet: RQ-11B Raven System, 
www.avinc.com/downloads/USAF_Raven_FactSheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
The Raven has an operating altitude range from 100 to 500 feet. It can be used for low-
altitude day- and night-surveillance. Id. It delivers real-time color or infrared imagery 
to ground control and remote viewing stations. Id. Although the single cost is $35,000, 
the entire system costs $250,000. See RQ-11 Raven Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, United 
States of America, ARMY-TECHNOLOGY.COM, http://www.army-technology.com/projects/ 
rq11-raven/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).  
 44 The Qube can “swoop[] back and forth” at an altitude of 200 feet, can 
“captur[e] crystal-clear video,” and is “controlled remotely by a tablet computer.” See 
Hennigan, supra note 19. 
 45 Gary Mortimer, Boeing ScanEagle, SUAS NEWS (Mar. 17, 2011), 
http://www.suasnews.com/boeing-scaneagle/. The ScanEagle is larger and has a 
wingspan of 10 feet. Id. 
 46 A160T Hummingbird, BOEING.COM, http://www.boeing.com/bds/phantom_ 
works/hummingbird/docs/hummingbird_overview.pdf (last updated Aug. 2012). The 
A160T Hummingbird weighs up to 6,500 pounds but does not need a runway for taking 
off or landing. Id. 
 47 Bennett, supra note 17.  
 48 See CBS DC, supra note 20. 
 49 See Andy Greenberg, Flying Drones Can Crack Wi-Fi Networks, Snoop on 
Cell Phones, FORBES.COM (July 28, 2011, 2:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
andygreenberg/2011/07/28/flying-drone-can-crack-wifi-networks-snoop-on-cell-phones/. 
 50 Visual surveillance includes photographs and video photography. The 
issues of electronic surveillance and drone weaponry will be left for another day. 
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drones can be used to hover over a location and continuously 
observe every action or movement of a specific person or 
vehicle, or to search for suspicious activities.51 
Drones may be put to many beneficial uses other than 
everyday governmental surveillance. Such uses could include 
search and rescue operations, spotting and fighting wildfires, 
police chases, hostage crises, manhunts, bomb threats, SWAT 
team operations, industrial disaster prevention, riot control 
strategies, and assessment of perils during or in the immediate 
aftermath of nuclear accidents, tsunamis, and earthquakes. No 
one could rightfully claim that these emergency governmental 
operations violate the Fourth Amendment; indeed, they would 
be permissible under the emergency exception52 to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement, even if drone surveillance 
were found unconstitutional in other circumstances. This 
article, however, focuses on law enforcement drone surveillance 
in non-emergency situations.  
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (Act) 
was signed into law on February 14, 2012, and will likely 
increase the use of drones in the future.53 The Act requires that 
the FAA authorize public agencies to use unmanned aircraft 
systems (also known as drones) in the domestic navigable 
airspace.54 On May 14, 2012, the FAA announced that an 
agreement had been reached with the Department of Justice’s 
National Institute of Justice in satisfaction of this Congressional 
mandate.55 The agreement allows a governmental public safety 
agency to operate drones under certain restrictions. Specifically, 
  
 51 See M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 
29, 30 (2011), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/ 
articles/64-SLRO-29_1.pdf. 
 52 See generally Edward G. Mascolo, The Emergency Doctrine Exception to the 
Warrant Requirement Under the Fourth Amendment, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 419, 426 (1972–
1973 ). In a true emergency, the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the police fail to 
get a search warrant before conducting what would otherwise be a search in order to 
deal with the emergency. Id. 
 53 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11. 
 54 Section 334 of the Act provides that the FAA shall enter into agreements 
with appropriate government agencies to simplify and expedite the process of obtaining 
authorization to operate public unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the national 
airspace system. Id. The agreements shall allow a government public safety agency to 
operate unmanned aircraft during daylight conditions, within uncontrolled airspace 
where operations may be conducted under Instrument Flight Rules or Visual Flight 
Rules. Id.; see also Section 3. Class G Airspace, FAA.GOV (Mar. 7, 2013), 
www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/atpubs/aim/aim0303.html. This is consistent with 
the list of already approved law enforcement COAs. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra 
note 21, for a partial list.  
 55 Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Makes Progress with UAS Integration, FAA.GOV, 
http://www.faa.gov/news/updates/?newsId=68004 (last modified May 14, 2012). 
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when a public agency has demonstrated proficiency in flying its 
drones, it will receive an operational Certificate of Authorization 
(COA).56 At the same time, private drone manufacturers eagerly 
await increased opportunities to sell their products to law 
enforcement based on their perception—supported by strong 
evidence—that the sale of drones will produce a very profitable 
market.57 “The goal is to have [drones] in the trunk of a police car 
and to have them be able to access those unmanned systems 
within minutes, if need be.”58 The inevitable proliferation of 
drones in the national airspace will thus require courts to 
reexamine how the Fourth Amendment should limit the invasion 
of privacy resulting from such law enforcement surveillance. 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND PROTECTION OF PRIVACY 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.59 
The Fourth Amendment does not ban all searches and 
seizures, only unreasonable ones.60 There are two steps 
required to determine whether a search61 violates the Fourth 
Amendment: (1) whether the government action constitutes a 
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment; and (2) 
  
 56 Proficiency would include safety-related issues that are beyond the scope of 
this article. Sections 332 to 336 of the Act require that the UASs have the “sense and 
avoid capability,” meaning the capability to remain a safe distance from, and to avoid 
collisions with other aircraft. FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-95, 126 Stat. 11. 
 57 See Jim Haddadin, Drones at Home? Unmanned Aircraft Cleared for 
Takeoff Inside U.S., FOSTERS.COM (Feb. 19, 2012), http://www.fosters.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20120219/GJNEWS_01/702199914 (“The legislation will be a boon to the 
unmanned vehicle industry, which was estimated by one industry group to be worth a 
combined $4.3 billion in 2011, according to [Ben] Gielow. That figure could reach $11 
billion by 2020.” (quoting Ben Gielow, Gov’t Relations Manager and General Counsel 
for the Ass’n for Unmanned Vehicle Systems Int’l)). 
 58 Id.  
 59 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). 
 60 Skinner v. Ry. Lab. Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
 61 Most of this article focuses on searches rather than seizures. A seizure is a 
“meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in [his] property.” 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting 
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). By its very nature, aerial 
surveillance by a drone is not a seizure because it does not interfere with any 
possessory interest of a person on the ground below. Indeed, the success of the 
surveillance depends on the stealth and non-interference capability of the drone. 
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if so, whether the search is “unreasonable” within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.62 
An “essential purpose of [the Fourth Amendment] is to 
protect privacy interests” against the “random or arbitrary acts 
of [the] government,”63 with the reasonableness requirement 
offering a safeguard and pivotal means of protecting a person’s 
privacy interest.64 Simply put, “The Amendment guarantees the 
privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain 
arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government or 
those acting at their direction.”65 
The “reasonableness” of a search depends on the 
circumstances existing at the time the search is conducted.66 
The degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth 
Amendment—as determined by what is reasonable under the 
circumstances—has changed over time due to both the 
development of technological advances67 and changes in Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Computers, smartphones, GPS 
devices, infrared detectors, night goggles, and X-ray scanners 
did not exist—nor were they foreseen—when the Fourth 
Amendment was enacted in 1791, or throughout much of the 
twentieth century when judicial pronouncements created many 
of the Amendment’s exceptions. On the one hand, these 
advances in technology have increased individuals’ privacy in 
many ways.68 On the other hand, they have also increased the 
technological ability to intrude on individuals’ privacy. This 
double-edged sword poses a difficult challenge for courts in their 
application of the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections.  
Changes in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence over time 
have also affected the degree of privacy the Fourth Amendment 
secures. Perhaps the most significant change occurred in 1967 
when the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United States.69 In 
Katz, the Court considered the legality of police eavesdropping 
on a telephone call made from an enclosed public telephone 
  
 62 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-22. 
 63 Id. at 621-22. 
 64 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 821 (2004) (citing Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977)). 
 65 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613-14. 
 66 See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 822. 
 67 Id. at 821 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001)). 
 68 As a result of increases in technology, we are now able to perform many 
tasks from our homes that previously required us to leave our homes and be observed 
in public (e.g., electronic banking, emails, text messages, phone and video conferences, 
Skype, etc.). See generally Simmons, supra note 3. 
 69 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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booth.70 The police listened in on Katz’s conversation that was 
taking place inside the booth by placing a listening device on the 
booth’s exterior. In many of the Fourth Amendment decisions 
before Katz, the Court had used physical intrusion into the 
defendant’s property as the triggering search that could lead to a 
constitutional violation, suggesting that the absence of any 
physical intrusion into a protected area would render the 
eavesdropping constitutionally permissible.71 The Court, however, 
took a different approach in Katz, finding a violation despite the 
fact that police committed no physical trespassory act.72  
As promulgated in Katz and its progeny, the controlling 
test to determine if a governmental action constitutes a 
“search” asks whether the individual holds a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.73 If the individual does hold such an 
expectation, then a warrant—or an exception to the warrant 
requirement—is necessary to avoid a Fourth Amendment 
violation.74 On the other hand, if the individual does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, there is no search and thus 
no Fourth Amendment violation.75 Perhaps foreshadowing the 
difficulties that future courts would confront in classifying 
constitutionally protected areas, the Katz Court emphasized 
that “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in 
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally 
protected.”76 This seemingly contradictory language has taken 
on new significance in situations involving new technologies 
such as drone surveillance. 
The Supreme Court has established a two-prong test77 
for determining whether an individual has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy: (1) whether the individual’s conduct 
reflects “an actual expectation of privacy,”78 and (2) whether it 
  
 70 Id. at 348. 
 71 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
 72 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
 73 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
 74 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 75 See id.  
 76 Id. at 351-52 (citation omitted). 
 77 This two-prong approach was initially suggested by Justice Harlan in his 
concurring opinion in Katz. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 78 The Court has indicated that in some very unusual situations, the 
subjective expectation prong of the reasonable expectation of privacy test might  
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is an expectation that society is prepared to recognize as 
“reasonable.”79 The first prong involves a subjective inquiry as to 
facts that can be fairly easily ascertained from the circumstances 
of the situation. The second prong, however, requires an 
objective analysis and has given courts a great deal of 
difficulty, in light of the fact that what society considers 
“reasonable” has changed over time.  
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test has been 
used in Fourth Amendment cases ever since, despite receiving 
heavy criticism throughout subsequent judicial decisions.80 For 
example, Justice Powell expressed concern that Fourth 
Amendment rights would “gradual[ly] decay” under the 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test “as technology advances.”81 
On a separate occasion, Justice Marshall suggested that the Katz 
test be replaced with a test that focuses “on the risks [the 
individual] should be forced to assume in a free and open society.”82  
  
provide an inadequate index of Fourth Amendment protection. For example, 
if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that 
all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless entry, individuals 
thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation of privacy 
regarding their homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a 
totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation’s traditions, erroneously 
assumed that police were continuously monitoring his telephone 
conversations, a subjective expectation of privacy regarding the contents of 
his calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, where an 
individual’s subjective expectations had been “conditioned” by influences 
alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective 
expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the 
scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. In determining whether a 
“legitimate expectation of privacy” existed in such cases, a normative inquiry 
would be proper.  
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979).  
 79 The first prong is a subjective test, and the second prong is an objective 
test. Both must be satisfied to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy. Examples 
of this test’s application can be found in Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) 
(overnight houseguest has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his temporary 
quarters), United States v. Cunag, 386 F.3d 888 (9th Cir. 2004) (no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in hotel room procured with forged ID documents and dead 
woman’s credit card), United States v. Lyons, 992 F.2d 1029 (10th Cir. 1993) (no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in contents of computer that the suspect stole), and 
People v. Pleasant, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 796 (2004) (people who live with probationers who 
remain subject to probation searches cannot reasonably expect privacy in areas of the 
residence that they share with the probationer).  
 80 It has been criticized as being “circular, . . . subjective[,] and 
unpredictable.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). It has also been 
criticized because a trial judge is likely to substitute his or her own expectations of 
privacy for society’s “reasonable person’s” expectations in the second prong of the test. 
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).  
 81 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 240 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 82 Smith, 442 U.S. at 750. (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
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Over the years, scholars have argued that Katz’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy test has outlived its 
usefulness and that today’s rapid rate of technological change 
requires a new test that would address the concerns raised by 
Justice Powell. Although frequently well devised, many 
proposed tests would present equal (if not greater) difficulties 
in application than the Katz test itself. Indeed, this is 
inevitable because the “reasonableness” exception to the 
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement mandates that any 
proposed alternative test include a “reasonableness” standard. 
For example, Professor Clancy’s test asks whether an individual 
has a “right to exclude” the government, but it nonetheless 
requires the court to determine whether the police conduct was 
“reasonable.”83 Professor Nowlin, on the other hand, refocuses 
the question of reasonableness around the Fourth Amendment’s 
“right to be secure” and would thereby replace a reasonable 
expectation of privacy with reasonable security.84 Professor 
  
 83 Thomas K. Clancy, Coping with Technological Change: Kyllo and the 
Proper Analytical Structure to Measure the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 72 
MISS. L.J. 525, 541 (2002).  
To adequately protect and give recognition to the ability to exclude, 
normative values must be employed. Do the precautions taken by the person 
objectively evidence an intent to exclude the human senses? Does the 
particular surveillance technique utilized by the government defeat the 
individual’s right to exclude? Would the “spirit motivating the framers” of the 
Amendment “abhor these new devices no less” than the “direct and obvious 
methods of oppression” that inspired the Fourth Amendment? The answer to 
each of these questions may be an empirical inquiry at times, but is always a 
value judgment.  
Id. at 549-50 (quoting Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 139 (1942) (Murphy, J., 
dissenting)). “The right to exclude is the sum and essence of the right protected.” Id. at 
541. A “search” would occur whenever “the police have learned something about the 
object that would otherwise have been imperceptible absent the use of the technological 
device.” Id. at 560. Although this right is not absolute because it only protects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, “the burden [would be] on the government to 
justify its actions” as reasonable. Id. at 564. 
 84 See Jake Wade Nowlin, The Warren Court’s House Built on Sand: From 
Security in Persons, Houses, Papers, and Effects to Mere Reasonableness in Fourth 
Amendment Doctrine, 81 MISS. L.J. 1017, 1051-52 (2012). The author’s contention is 
that in its effort to expand the Fourth Amendment protection by introducing the 
reasonable expectation of privacy standard, the Warren Court actually set in motion 
the unintended consequence of reducing privacy in one’s person, house, papers, and 
effects. See id. at 1019. This occurred because the focus shifted away from the 
enumerated protected interests of that clause and focused on the reasonableness of the 
police conduct under the circumstances. See id. at 1082-83. Nowlin would require that 
police conduct provide “reasonable security” to the protected interests enumerated in 
the amendment. Id. at 1080; see also Timothy Casey, Electronic Surveillance and the 
Right to Be Secure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 977 (2008). Casey would “redefin[e] the 
[Amendment’s] protection . . . as a security interest rather than a privacy interest, 
[thereby] dispel[ling] the false dichotomy between privacy and security.” Id. at 1027. 
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Penney offers an economically informed cost-benefit analysis of 
the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test that would offer no 
protection “when [the expectation of privacy’s] primary effect 
[would] impede the optimal deterrence of crime.”85 Such a 
framework, however, would present even more difficult 
determinations as to what constitutes the “primary” effect of 
such an expectation or the “optimal” level of deterrence of 
crime. Professor Slobogin’s two-part proportionality and 
exigency framework appears to eliminate any warrant 
exception other than exigency.86 
Professors Kerr and Ohm have proposed Equilibrium-
Adjustment theories that aim to maintain the balance between 
police power and civil liberties.87 Under Professor Kerr’s 
approach, the Supreme Court would adjust the scope of 
protection in response to new facts in order to maintain the 
status quo level of protection.88 But a difficulty with this test 
lies in the fact that the Supreme Court usually takes at least 
five to ten years after a technological development emerges 
before it ultimately considers any Fourth Amendment issue on 
that particular innovation.89 Professor Ohm would determine 
  
 85 Steven Penney, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search 
Technologies: An Economic Approach, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 477, 480 (2007). 
As Professor Penney explains, if privacy is  
used chiefly to conceal socially harmful conduct (such as crime), then legal 
protection for privacy in that realm should be weak and police should be 
given broad search powers. If, on the other hand, privacy encourages efficient 
behaviors, then legal protections should be strong and police powers should 
be limited. 
Id. at 491. In essence, Professor Penney proposes a balancing test, weighing the costs 
and benefits of limiting the government’s ability to obtain information about criminal 
activities. Id. at 491-92. 
 86 See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
107, 109 (2010). Professor Slobogin proposes that the justification for the search must 
be proportional to its intrusiveness. Id. at 139. The analysis should focus on “hit rates” 
and the likelihood of success, not the importance of the governmental interest. Id. If no 
exigency exists, the police should obtain judicial authorization. Id. at 141. But, 
Professor Slobogin also exempts most suspicionless group searches and would defer to 
a legislative approach on those. Id.  
 87 Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 482 (2011) (“When changing technology or social 
practice expands police power, threatening civil liberties, courts can tighten Fourth 
Amendment rules to restore the status quo. The converse is true, as well. When 
changing technology or social practice restricts police power, threatening public safety, 
courts can loosen Fourth Amendment rules to achieve the same goal.”); Paul Ohm, The 
Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309 (2012). 
 88 Kerr, supra note 87, at 487. 
 89 For example, the Jones case on GPS surveillance was decided in 2012, 
more than twelve years after GPS technology had been made commonly available to 
the public. On May 1, 2000, President Clinton “ordered the U.S. military to stop 
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the proper balance by using metrics to determine that “it 
should take, on average, just as long to solve a crime today as it 
has in the past.”90 A few issues, however, could pose difficulties 
in applying the Ohm test. First, how would courts decide what 
starting date to use as a basis for the “past”? Second, the test 
might also overlook the fact that police techniques have 
changed significantly over the years and police investigations 
have become much more efficient. Third, it would seem almost 
impossible to measure the average length of investigations in 
the past, even if that data were available.  
Underlying each of these proposed tests and the current 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test itself is the same 
fundamental question of where to draw the balance between 
law enforcement power and civil liberties91: How should the 
Court determine what society is willing to accept as “reasonable” 
or what constitutes “reasonable security”? Reasonableness 
should vary as a function of society’s evolving practices and 
mores and national events. But should this be determined by 
taking a poll of society?92 Such an approach would create 
  
scrambling signals from its [GPS] satellite network, thus making the data available to 
civilian GPS owners. This action allowed boaters, motorists, and hikers using GPS 
receivers to enjoy the far more precise positioning data previously available only to the 
military.” Robert Longley, Civilians Can Use Military GPS Data, ABOUT.COM (May 3, 
2000), http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/news/aa050300b.htm. 
 90 Ohm, supra note 87, at 1345-46 (emphasis added). The author discusses 
the different scholarly suggestions in a world where privacy is disappearing and finds 
them inadequate, including Kerr’s Equilibrium-Adjustment theory. Id. at 1310-13. 
Professor Ohm proposes a different kind of Equilibrium-Adjustment theory where the 
balance of power between the police and the citizens is adjusted by the courts as 
needed based on the metrics, either by shifting the balance back to the citizen by 
introducing other requirements such as necessity, or back to the police such as is found 
in the Electronic Communication Privacy Act (ECPA). He also proposes making the 
default rule in favor of the citizen. Id. at 1348-49, 1351-52. 
 91 Professor Lee would shift the balance more in favor of the citizen. See 
generally Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133 (2012). Lee proposes replacing the 
reasonableness standard that defers too much to governmental interest with a more 
rigorous non-deferential standard of review. See id. She proposes a hybrid model 
involving rebuttable presumptions and four factors if the warrantless search did not 
fall within an established exception: (1) a presumption of unreasonableness would 
apply if the search was highly intrusive; (2) a presumption of unreasonableness would 
arise if the search was not supported by probable cause; (3) there would be a 
presumption of unreasonableness if there was little or no danger to the officer, the 
public, or the investigation; (4) the good faith or bad faith of the officer would also be 
considered; (5) if an established exception applied, at least two of these factors would 
be required to rebut the presumption of reasonableness. Id. at 1171-75. 
 92 Consider, for example, the “anger” of smart phone subscribers and car 
owners when it was suggested that the GPS in those devices could be used for covert 
tracking of their movements. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 n.* (2012) 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). A February 13, 2012 Rasmussen poll reported that 52% of 
voters are opposed to domestic police drone surveillance. “Only 30% favor the use of 
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enormous difficulties.93 Nor can these societal practices and 
mores be decided by nine Justices—or by whichever trial judges 
happen to be presented with the issue in the first instance94—
based on their personal views or drawn only from their life 
experiences.95 As Justice Alito suggested in Jones, Congressional 
action may be the closest practical way of determining the pulse 
of the nation, given that legislators are elected to represent the 
will of the people.96 But then again, the Court would be 
abdicating its role in interpreting and upholding the supremacy 
of the Constitution if legislation were used as the sole 
measuring tool for Fourth Amendment protection.  
The discussion above shows why Katz’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test has survived and continues to 
endure today, despite the existence of heavy criticism and 
many proposed alternatives.97 The question thus becomes: How 
  
unmanned drones for domestic surveillance. Seventeen percent (17%) are undecided.” 
Voters Are Gung-Ho for Use of Drones but not Over the United States, RASMUSSEN REPS. 
(Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/ 
afghanistan/voters_are_gung_ho_for_use_of_drones_but_not_over_the_united_states. A 
Monmouth University poll released June 12, 2012, showed that  
[a]n overwhelming majority of Americans support the idea of using drones to 
help with search and rescue missions (80%). Two-thirds of the public also 
support using drones to track down runaway criminals (67%) and control 
illegal immigration on the nation’s border (64%). One area where Americans 
say that drones should not be used, though, is to issue speeding tickets. Only 
23% support using drones for this routine police activity while a large 
majority (67%) oppose[s] the idea. . . . Specifically, 42% of Americans would 
be very concerned and 22% would be somewhat concerned about their own 
privacy if U.S. law enforcement started using unmanned drones with high 
tech surveillance cameras. Another 16% would be just a little concerned and 
15% would not be concerned at all.  
Press Release, Monmouth Univ. Poll, U.S. Supports Some Domestic Drone Use: But 
Public Registers Concern About Own Privacy (June 12, 2012), available at 
https://www.monmouth.edu/assets/0/84/159/2147483694/3b904214-b247-4c28-a5a7-
cf3ee1f0261c.pdf.  
 93 What if the public was almost evenly divided on the issue? Would a simple 
majority dictate what is “reasonable”? How often should the poll be taken? Should 
another poll be taken when a major national event, such as the 9/11 attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon, occurs? In addition, should the poll questions 
distinguish between the different types of investigations (e.g., surveillance of domestic 
terrorists versus drug cases)?  
 94 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 95 See id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Scalia has sarcastically 
pointed out that the expectations of privacy “that society is prepared to recognize as 
reasonable bear an uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this 
Court considers reasonable.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96 See id. at 962-63 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 97 See id. at 953-54.  
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long can the test survive in our rapidly evolving technological 
world of drones? That issue is addressed below in Part V. 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF CURRENT AERIAL SURVEILLANCE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Supreme Court did not overrule prior aerial 
surveillance cases in Jones.98 Thus, the existing aerial 
surveillance jurisprudence must be reviewed in order to foretell 
if and to what extent the Court may uphold the 
constitutionality of drone surveillance of our neighborhoods 
given the conflicting opinions in Jones. 
The leading case on aerial surveillance by the 
government is California v. Ciraolo, a 1986 case in which the 
Court applied Katz’s two-prong reasonable-expectation-of-
privacy test and held, five to four, that a warrantless, naked-
eye police observation of the backyard of a house did not 
constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment where it 
was conducted from a fixed-wing aircraft at 1000 feet above 
ground.99 The Court accepted the fact that the backyard was 
within the curtilage of the house and that the defendant had 
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy by erecting a fence 
that completely shielded the yard from observation from the 
street.100 Nevertheless, the Court held that the defendant’s 
expectations were not “reasonable” under the Katz’s second 
prong; they were not expectations “that society [was] prepared to 
honor”101 because private and commercial flights in the navigable 
airspace102 were routine.103 The Ciraolo majority deemed it 
irrelevant that the flight and observations were not part of a 
routine police flight but were instead acts specifically focused 
on the defendant’s property.104 In addition, the Court analogized 
the publicly navigable airspace to public thoroughfares105 and 
indicated that if no physical intrusion occurs, even the home 
  
 98 See infra Part IV. 
 99 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986).  
 100 Id. at 211-12. 
 101 Id. at 213-14. 
 102 One thousand feet falls within the navigable airspace as defined by the 
FAA. Id. at 213 (citing 49 U.S.C. App. § 1304).  
 103 Id. at 215. 
 104 Id. at 214 n.2. 
 105 Id. at 213 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his 
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” (quoting Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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and its curtilage are not necessarily protected from 
inspection.106 
On the same day it decided Ciraolo, the Court decided 
another aerial surveillance case in Dow Chemical Co. v. United 
States.107 In Dow, the Environmental Protection Agency had 
taken photographs of open areas at Dow Chemical’s 2000-acre 
manufacturing facility using a standard precision aerial 
mapping camera.108 The Court, (with the same exact 5-4 split as 
in Ciraolo) held that “the taking of aerial photographs of an 
industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search 
prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”109 It found that Dow had 
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy by implementing 
multiple security measures aimed at preventing visual 
observation of its complex from the outside.110 However, in 
applying the Katz’s second prong, the majority concluded that 
the open areas of the industrial complex were not analogous to 
a house’s “curtilage”111 but instead more closely resembled an 
“open field.”112 Thus, the majority determined that they were 
open to observation by persons in aircraft lawfully present in 
navigable public airspace.113 
The majority emphasized that the camera used was not 
a “unique sensory device that, for example, could penetrate the 
walls of buildings and record conversations in [the buildings’ 
interiors], but rather a conventional, albeit precise, commercial 
camera commonly used in mapmaking.”114 The majority also 
suggested that its holding would not open the floodgates for all 
photography, indicating that the Fourth Amendment may 
nevertheless limit the technological sophistication of the 
cameras involved. As the Court explained, “[i]t may well be, as 
the Government concedes, that surveillance of private property 
by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not 
  
 106 See id. 
 107 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
 108 Id. at 229. 
 109 Id.  
 110 Id. at 237 (“Dow’s inner manufacturing areas are elaborately secured to 
ensure they are not open or exposed to the public from the ground.”). 
 111 Id. at 239. The Court’s efforts in distinguishing this area from the curtilage 
seems unnecessary because on the same day, the Court allowed aerial surveillance of 
the curtilage in Ciraolo. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213, 215. 
 112 Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239. The “open fields” doctrine was reaffirmed 
in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). The “open fields” common law doctrine 
allows law enforcement to enter and search a “field” without a warrant. See discussion 
infra Part IV. 
 113 Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239. 
 114 Id. at 238. 
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generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, 
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”115  
Three years later, in Florida v. Riley,116 the Court was 
faced with a set of facts similar to those in Ciraolo. The case 
differed, however, in that the observing officer flew in a 
helicopter at an altitude of 400 feet rather than in a fixed-wing 
plane at an altitude of 1000 feet, as in Ciraolo. A divided Court 
agreed, five to four,117 that an officer’s warrantless observation, 
with his naked eye, of the interior of a partially covered 
greenhouse in a residential backyard118 did not constitute a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment119 where it was 
conducted from a helicopter circling 400 feet above. 
Once again, the Court accepted the fact that the 
defendant had exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy by 
planting trees and shrubs and positioning his mobile home so 
as to shield the greenhouse from observation from the 
surrounding property.120 In applying Katz’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, five Justices found that the 
defendant could not reasonably have expected that the 
uncovered sides and roof of the greenhouse were protected from 
public inspection because planes and helicopters engaged in 
routine private and commercial flights could have made the 
same observations.121 
All nine Justices agreed that the second prong of Katz 
was the controlling issue and that the decision turned on the 
regularity of public travel in that airspace and at that 
altitude.122 On that point, five Justices placed the burden of 
  
 115 Id. (emphasis added). We see here a similar qualification to the “not in 
general public use” standard that the Court majority would later assert in the Kyllo 
case, which involved an infrared sensing device. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 
40 (2001); see also infra notes 302-308 and accompanying text. 
 116 488 U.S. 445 (1989). 
 117 The decision was 5-4 on the Katz second prong. Justice O’Connor, 
concurring, joined the other four Justices in the majority in holding that society was 
not prepared to recognize the defendant’s expectations as reasonable. Id. at 453-55 
(O’Connor, J. concurring). Justice O’Connor indicated that the pivotal issue on the 
second prong of the test turned on the routine nature of public flights at the altitude in 
question rather than on whether the helicopter was allowed by the FAA to legally 
operate at that altitude. Id. at 454. 
 118 The defendant “lived in a mobile home located on five acres of rural property. 
[The] greenhouse was located ten to twenty feet behind the mobile home.” Id. at 448. 
 119 Id. at 451-52. 
 120 Id. at 450. 
 121 Id. at 451. Five Justices agreed on imposing the burden of proof on this 
issue on the defendant. Id. at 455 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 122 In other words, the Court considered the frequency and altitude of flyovers 
by non-police helicopters. Id. at 451 (majority opinion), 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring), 
456-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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proof on the defendant and found no constitutional violation 
because the defendant failed to demonstrate that public flight 
over the property at the altitude in question rarely occurred.123 
The four dissenting Justices, however, would have placed the 
burden of proof on the state.124 Meanwhile, four Justices in the 
plurality emphasized the fact that the FAA permitted 
helicopters to fly legally at an altitude of 400 feet and treated 
this as a significant factor.125 Five Justices nonetheless 
disagreed on that point.126 
The Riley case provides a prime example of the 
continuing difficulties in applying Katz’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy test. Notably, the Court’s composition changed 
between the decisions in Ciraolo and Riley.127 It changed again 
between the time of the Riley decision and the Jones decision. 
Indeed, Justices Scalia and Kennedy—both members of the 
Riley majority—are the only Justices from the Riley Court who 
remain on the Court today, and both were members of the 
Jones majority, as well.128 This suggests that at least these two 
Justices would be willing to uphold drone surveillance even of 
the curtilage under certain conditions, a proposition which is 
discussed more fully below. 
IV. UNITED STATES V. JONES 
In United States v. Jones,129 government agents had 
placed a Global-Positioning-System (GPS) tracking device on a 
car registered to the defendant’s wife,130 placing it “on the 
undercarriage of the [car] while it was parked in a public 
parking lot.”131 The agents then remotely monitored the car’s 
  
 123 Id. at 451 (majority opinion); id. at 455 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
 124 Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 468 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 125 Id. at 451 (majority opinion). 
 126 Id. at 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 127 Ciraolo was decided 5-4 with Justices Burger, Rehnquist, White, Stevens, 
and O’Connor in the majority, and Justices Powell, Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun 
dissenting. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 208 (1986). On the other hand, Riley 
was decided by the plurality of Justices White, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and 
O’Connor, with Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dissenting. Riley, 488 U.S. 
at 447, 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 128 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 129 Id. 
 130 There was no dispute as to whether the defendant had standing to raise 
the Fourth Amendment issue with respect to his wife’s car because the defendant was 
the “exclusive driver” of the car. Id. at 949 n.2. 
 131 Id. at 948. 
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location continuously for twenty-eight days.132 Following the 
investigation and arrest, the defendants were indicted on 
cocaine trafficking conspiracy charges.133 The trial court 
suppressed the GPS information obtained from the car while it 
was parked inside the garage adjoining defendant’s residence 
but permitted all other data, finding that defendant had “no 
reasonable expectation of privacy” in the car when it was 
located on public streets.134 The defendant was eventually 
convicted and sentenced to life in prison.135 The appellate court 
reversed, finding that the admission of the GPS location 
information violated the Fourth Amendment.136 The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari on the issue of “whether the attachment 
of a [GPS] tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and 
subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s 
movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”137 On January 
23, 2012, the Court unanimously held that the admission of 
this evidence violated the Fourth Amendment.138 However, the 
Justices could not agree on the reasoning for upholding the 
judgment,139 producing three separate opinions.140 
Five Justices joined in the majority opinion written by 
Justice Scalia.141 The majority held that attaching the GPS to 
the car and using it to monitor the car’s movements constituted 
a search that violated the Fourth Amendment.142 For that 
reason, Justice Scalia’s opinion found it unnecessary to decide 
whether the subsequent long-term monitoring also violated the 
constitution.143 In an opinion written by Justice Alito, which 
concurred only in the judgment, the other four Justices144 found 
  
 132 Id. at 948. The agents had obtained a search warrant allowing them to 
install the GPS device within ten days in the District of Columbia. Id. The GPS was 
placed on the 11th day (after the warrant period had expired) and the installation took 
place in Maryland, not in the District of Columbia. Id. Accordingly, the government 
conceded non-compliance with the warrant, and the case was decided as if there had 
been no warrant. Id. at 948 n.1. 
 133 Id. at 948. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Id. at 948-49. 
 136 Id. at 949. 
 137 Id. at 948. 
 138 Id. at 945. 
 139 Id. at 948. 
 140 Id.  
 141 The Justices were Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas, Sotomayor, and Scalia. Id. at 947. 
 142 See generally id. 
 143 Id. at 954. 
 144 The Justices were Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Alito. Id. at 957 (Alito, 
J., concurring).  
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that the placement of the GPS device did not constitute a 
search but that the subsequent long-term monitoring itself 
violated the Fourth Amendment.145 Justice Sotomayor filed a 
separate concurring opinion, agreeing with both the majority 
and part of Justice Alito’s concurring opinion.146 Justice 
Sotomayor provided the fifth vote for the Court’s holding that the 
attachment of the GPS was a search,147 but she also agreed with 
the other four concurring Justices that the long-term monitoring 
was unreasonable.148 Between all of these concurrences, five 
Justices held that around-the-clock surveillance for 28 days was 
unconstitutional, and five Justices held that the placement of the 
GPS itself represented an unconstitutional search. 
In order to fully assess the constitutionality of drone 
surveillance, we must then analyze what impact the conflicting 
Jones opinions might have on the issue. The majority found 
that the placement of the GPS device constituted a trespass on 
the defendant’s personal property and therefore violated the 
Fourth Amendment.149 That portion of the opinion will not 
provide much insight in the analysis of drone surveillance, 
which will most likely occur from an aerial position without 
any trespass to property.150 On the other hand, the concurrences 
of the other five Justices provide far more insight as to how the 
Court would treat such an occurrence. Together, those five 
Justices should provide a majority when applying the reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test in drone surveillance cases. This part 
analyzes the dicta contained in the various opinions with the 
aim of shedding light on the Court’s most likely path in 
deciding future drone cases.  
A. The Majority Opinion 
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia made it clear that 
the Court was not abandoning the reasonable expectation of 
  
 145 Id. at 964. 
 146 Id. at 954-55. 
 147 Id. at 954. 
 148 Id. at 955. 
 149 Id. at 949. 
 150 But see discussion supra Part I, concerning the capability of very small 
drones, such as the Nano Hummingbird, that can fly in and out of open windows or 
doorways. Nevertheless, we do know that two of the Justices in the majority, Justices 
Scalia and Kennedy, had previously upheld aerial surveillance by a plane of the 
curtilage in the Riley case. See discussion supra Part III. Because Justices Scalia and 
Kennedy decided Jones on a trespass theory, we need to look back to their rationale in 
Riley in order to predict how they would rule when faced with a non-trespassory drone 
surveillance (of the curtilage and other areas) in the future. 
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privacy test. He pointed out that Katz’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy test had not repudiated the common-law trespass test 
that existed before Katz and that both tests continued to exist 
concurrently in testing for Fourth Amendment violations.151 
“Katz, the Court explained [in Soldal v. Cook County], 
established that the ‘property rights are not the sole measure of 
Fourth Amendment violations’ but did not ‘snuf[f] out the 
previously recognized protection for property.’”152 The majority 
indicated that it did not need to decide whether the defendant 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy because the trespass153 
upon the defendant’s personal property alone violated the 
Fourth Amendment. The majority referred to the Knotts154 and 
Karo,155 cases in which the Court had allowed location 
monitoring of a police beeper attached to a container in a car. 
The majority distinguished the holdings of those decisions by 
pointing out that the police in those two cases had planted the 
beeper before the defendant obtained a possessory interest in 
the property. As a result, no initial trespass on the defendant’s 
property had occurred.156 
The Jones majority emphasized the importance that 
originalism must play in interpreting the Fourth Amendment. 
Indeed, the majority explained that the Fourth Amendment 
“must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it 
afforded when it was adopted.”157 When no trespass occurs—
such as in a case involving “merely the transmission of 
electronic signals”—Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test 
  
 151 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 353 (1967). 
 152 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992)). 
 153 The majority conceded that “a trespass on ‘houses’ or ‘effects,’ or a Katz 
invasion of privacy, is not alone a search unless it is done to obtain information; and 
the obtaining of information is not alone a search unless it is achieved by such a 
trespass or invasion of privacy.” Id. at 951 n.5. 
 154 In United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 275 (1983), the police monitored the 
location of the defendant’s car by tracking a beeper in a container in the car while the 
car travelled on public roads for a few hours. Id. at 277-79. (Although the record is not specific 
on this issue, the distance between the locations described is approximately 200 miles). 
 155 Similar to the circumstances in Knotts, in United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 
705 (1984), the police tracked a beeper in a can of ether in the defendant’s car off and 
on for multiple days as the car moved from place to place on public roads. Id. at 706-10. 
The Karo opinion did not specifically define the length of each surveillance, but the 
beeper was tracked on at least six separate days over five months. The longest distance 
travelled was approximately 140 miles. The Court only allowed the beeper information 
into evidence when the car was on public roads but disallowed any information that 
was obtained when the beeper was inside any house or building. Id. at 714-15. 
 156 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.  
 157 Id. at 953. 
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applies.158 The majority also reiterated that “a person 
traveling . . . on public [roads] has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his movements” and that visual surveillance by a large 
team of officers, multiple vehicles, and aerial assistance does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment.159 The Court found it unnecessary, 
however, to decide the constitutionality of “achieving the same 
result through electronic means, without an accompanying 
trespass[,]” leaving that question for another day.160 
What insight does the majority opinion provide with 
respect to drone surveillance? Four Justices refused to join the 
other five Justices in finding that around-the-clock surveillance 
for twenty-eight days necessarily violated the subject’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.161 As such, one can infer that those four 
Justices could find such surveillance constitutionally permissible 
in a similar drug case,162 even where no physical trespass to 
property had occurred. The other five Justices would 
nonetheless prevail on this issue. 
B. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion163 
Although Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, he 
strongly disagreed about the continued existence of the 
trespass-based rule.164 He pointed out that after the trespass 
approach had been “repeatedly criticized,”165 Katz “finally did 
away with [it] . . . .”166 Indeed, twenty-three years after Katz, the 
Karo Court had made it clear that “an actual trespass is neither 
necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”167  
Justice Alito insisted that, despite its difficulties, Katz’s 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test remained the proper test 
to use.168 He acknowledged that “[i]t involves a degree of 
  
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 953-54. 
 160 Id. at 954. 
 161 Although Justice Sotomayor joined the majority’s trespass theory, she also 
agreed with Justice Alito’s concurring opinion that the 24/7 twenty-eight-day 
monitoring violated the Fourth Amendment. See supra Part IV.C. 
 162 This was contrary to the other five Justices who found this case not to 
involve an “extraordinary offense” where it would allow such surveillance. See infra 
notes 177-178 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Alito’s concurring opinion) 
and notes 227-230. 
 163 Joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957.  
 164 Id. at 957-58 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 165 Id. at 959. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 960 (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168 Id. at 958, 962.  
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circularity” and that “judges are apt to confuse their own 
expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable 
person . . . .”169 Society, he explained, may “eventually reconcile” 
with “the diminution of privacy that new technology entails,” 
accepting the “convenience or security at the expense of 
privacy.”170 He suggested that the enactment of legislation 
might be the “best solution to privacy concerns” in the rapidly 
evolving technological era.171 
However, because Congress had not acted to regulate 
this matter, Justice Alito conceded that “[t]he best that we can do 
in this case is to apply [the Katz test] and ask, whether the use of 
the GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of 
intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”172 
Under this approach, the four concurring Justices stated 
that a “relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s movements 
on public streets” would be reasonable (citing Knotts as an 
example);173 on the other hand, “longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses” would be unreasonable.174 “For 
such offenses, society’s expectation [is] that” the police cannot 
“secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an 
individual’s car for a very long period.”175 Finally, the four 
Justices stated that around-the-clock monitoring for four weeks 
would constitute an unreasonable search in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment.176  
Justice Alito did not define what a “very long period” or 
“longer term” meant, indicating simply that “[o]ther cases may 
present more difficult questions.”177 Likewise, he did not define 
what he meant by “most offenses” but suggested that, with 
respect to “extraordinary offenses,” prolonged GPS monitoring 
may be reasonable because, in those cases, “long-term tracking 
might have been mounted using previously available 
techniques.”178 Nor did he define the demarcation line for what 
  
 169 Id. at 962. 
 170 Id.  
 171 See id. at 964.  
 172 Id. It does not appear that Justice Alito was changing the Katz second 
prong by substituting “the reasonable person’s anticipation” for “what society is 
prepared to accept as reasonable.” The terms would seem to be interchangeable as an 
expression of “society’s expectations”; the latter is a term that Justice Alito also used in 
the same context. 
 173 Id. (emphasis added). 
 174 See id. (emphasis added).  
 175 See id. (emphasis added). 
 176 See id.  
 177 Id.  
 178 Id. at 954, 964.  
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constitutes “prolonged” monitoring or what qualifies as an 
“extraordinary offense.”179 
However, Justices Alito and Sotomayor’s concurrences 
sufficiently indicate that the Court would permit short-term—
but not most long-term—surveillance and, along with the 
Justices who joined their opinions, would likely form a majority 
in drone cases under similar contexts. Part V discusses this 
issue further. 
C. Justice Sotomayor’s Concurring Opinion 
Justice Sotomayor, in her concurring opinion, joined the 
majority’s originalist approach, finding that the trespass test 
was an “irreducible constitutional minimum” of the Fourth 
Amendment.180 She also agreed that, in situations without a 
trespass, Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test would 
apply.181 On the other hand, she “agree[d] with Justice Alito[‘s 
concurring opinion] that, at the very least, longer term GPS 
monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on 
expectations of privacy.”182 
With regard to short-term GPS monitoring in cases that 
do not involve trespasses, Justice Sotomayor went further than 
Justice Alito. She expressed concerns that such monitoring 
may “chill[] associational and expressive freedoms,”183 and that 
the government’s “unrestrained power” to collect private 
information on individuals is “susceptible to abuse.”184 
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her 
familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. 
(“Disclosed in [GPS] data . . . will be . . . trips to the psychiatrist, the 
plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip 
club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union 
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and 
on.”).185 
Justice Sotomayor added that she would consider these 
factors when deciding the “reasonable societal expectation of 
  
 179 See id. at 954. 
 180 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 181 Id.  
 182 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 183 See id. at 956. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. at 955 (quoting People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 441-42 (2009) (first 
alteration in original)). 
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privacy in the sum of one’s public movements” in short-term 
GPS monitoring.186 The fact that all this information could have 
been gathered by means of “lawful conventional surveillance” 
would not be dispositive of this issue.187 Moreover, she expressed 
strong concern about entrusting law enforcement, in the absence 
of judicial oversight, with “a tool so amenable to misuse, 
especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb 
arbitrary exercises of police power and to prevent ‘a too 
permeating police surveillance.’”188 GPS monitoring could collect 
such a “substantial quantum of intimate information about any 
person who the Government, in its unfettered discretion, 
chooses to track” that such monitoring “may ‘alter the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is 
inimical to democratic society.’”189  
In addition to these passionate concerns, Justice 
Sotomayor suggested two important developments in her 
future analyses of Fourth Amendment issues. First, she 
criticized the long-standing concept of third-party disclosure: 
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise 
that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach 
may be ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great 
deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of 
carrying out mundane tasks.190 
Second, Justice Sotomayor stated that secrecy should no 
longer serve as a prerequisite for privacy.191 Information 
“disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose” 
may be constitutionally protected.192 Indeed, she argued that 
“[p]rivacy is not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or 
not at all.”193  
Justice Sotomayor’s dicta support a reasonable 
inference that she would reject the rule that categorically 
precludes Fourth Amendment protection of anything exposed 
to the public. Similarly, Justice Sotomayor would likely hold 
drone surveillance unconstitutional, even if a person’s activities 
  
 186 Id. at 956. 
 187 Id. 
 188 See id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). 
 189 Id. (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
 190 Id. at 957 (citation omitted). 
 191 Id. 
 192 See id. 
 193 Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting)). 
2013] THE DRONES ARE COMING! 1307 
 
were publicly observable, if the governmental intrusion on the 
person’s privacy is extensive. 
The concurring opinions in Jones provide significant 
insight about what the Court may do in the future when faced 
with drone surveillance in public places. These five Justices 
would most likely represent the majority in drone cases. 
However, since the concurring Justices in Jones focused on the 
duration of surveillance rather than on the nature of the 
observations, a comprehensive analysis of drone surveillance 
issues must also consider previous surveillance jurisprudence 
that assessed the nature of the observations, either with the 
naked eye194 or with photography,195 given that drone surveillance 
will necessarily involve photography of visual observations. 
V. HOW WILL THE SUPREME COURT APPLY THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT WHEN POLICE USE DRONES IN OUR 
NEIGHBORHOODS? 
A. The Challenge of Applying Katz’s Reasonable 
Expectation of Privacy Test to Advanced Drone 
Technology 
As law enforcement’s use of drones becomes more 
routine, how will the Supreme Court strike the proper balance 
under the Fourth Amendment between protecting individual 
privacy and permitting law enforcement to engage in 
investigative activity? Drones will most likely operate within 
“navigable airspace” as the FAA is likely to define it.196 And 
because of their design, drones will not interfere with people on 
the ground by creating undue noise, dust, pollution, or threat of 
injury.197 Their use will not involve any physical intrusion on 
property except in the unlikely event that a drone were to 
physically enter the home.198 Visual surveillance is not, in itself, 
trespassory because “the eye . . . cannot be guilty of trespass.”199 
  
 194 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207 (1986).  
 195 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986). 
 196 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.  
 197 See supra Part I. The absence of “undue noise, . . . wind, dust, or threat of 
injury” was a factor considered by the majority in deciding that the aerial surveillance 
of the curtilage was not a “search” in Riley. 488 U.S. at 452. 
 198 It is unlikely that any law enforcement agency would push the envelope by 
sending a drone into a home, even though doing so is technologically possible. See 
supra Part I (discussing small drones, such as the Nano Hummingbird).  
 199 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (quoting Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886)). 
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As such, the trespass theory employed by the Jones majority 
and pre-Katz cases will offer little assistance in applying the 
Fourth Amendment to drone surveillance. The Court will have 
no choice but to use the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy 
test or create a new test.200 There is no reason to create a new 
test, however, because, as will be discussed below, the existing 
reasonable expectation of privacy test can effectively control 
drone surveillance. 
While Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test may 
be difficult to apply in our rapidly evolving technological 
society, the other proposed tests201 also present problems in 
their application. Even the principle of originalism has its critics.202 
Indeed, originalism will not solve the problem in many cases 
because the drafters of the Fourth Amendment could not have 
foreseen the manner in which new technology simultaneously 
advances privacy and threatens it.203 As Justice Alito argued in 
Jones, any attempt to draw realistic analogies more than two 
hundred years after the enactment of the Fourth Amendment 
would be “unwise” and “highly artificial.” 204 How can anyone 
presume to know what the drafters would have intended had 
they faced the incredible augmentation of privacy of our 
computer age? How too can anyone know what they would have 
intended to protect upon violation of that newly augmented 
privacy? If originalism means that the protection of privacy 
should remain exactly as it was in 1791, regardless of the 
method used by law enforcement, then it should follow that the 
  
 200 It is highly unlikely that the Court would allow complete free-for-all use of 
drones by law enforcement, relegating the entire controlling authority to Congress. 
This is true despite Justice Alito’s argument in Jones in which he suggested that 
Congressional action would provide the best solution in the rapidly evolving 
technological world. See supra note 171 and accompanying text. The important 
question becomes where the Court will draw the line under the Fourth Amendment. 
 201 See supra Part II. 
 202 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Responding to the Challenges of Contextual 
Change and Legal Dynamism in Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, 81 MISS. L.J. 
1085, 1088 (2012). The social and institutional context was completely different: the 
founders of the Fourth Amendment understood that the common law was dynamic and 
subject to change by judicial decisions or by statutes; there was no pro-active police 
force then; the 1791 criminal justice system was amateurish, reactive, and took little 
action absent judicial authorization; the 1791 search and seizure rule vanished during 
the nineteenth century. “[I]t is arbitrary to suppose that the founders would have clung 
to specific rules when a changed institutional context made those rules dysfunctional.” 
Id. at 1121. Perhaps the strongest originalism argument is “an aspirational balance of 
advantage originalism,” id. at 1128 (emphasis omitted); that is, an argument that “asks 
whether [a] search[] [or] seizure[] threaten[s] the priority of individual liberty and 
privacy, as against public security, that the founders aspired to.” Id. 
 203 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 533-34. 
 204 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
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privacy of a citizen in his home’s curtilage, secluded from 
public sight, should remain as protected today as it was in 
1791; any surveillance from the sky would thus result in a 
privacy violation. Yet, the Court has held otherwise in Ciraolo 
and Riley.205 Even Justice Scalia, the passionate advocate of 
originalism, joined the majority in Riley that held that aerial 
surveillance of the curtilage from an altitude of 400 feet is 
constitutionally permissible.206 
At the core of the reasonable expectation of privacy 
test—and most of the suggested substitute tests, whether 
labeled “reasonableness,” “protection of security,” or 
“equilibrium adjustment”—the controlling issue remains how 
to strike the proper balance between providing governmental 
protection to citizens and prosecuting crime, on the one hand, 
and respecting individual citizens’ privacy and security in their 
intimate activities, on the other. Ultimately, the question of 
balancing society’s interests with those of the individual 
reflects a fundamental issue of the “social contract” between 
individuals and their government.207  
In striking the proper balance, “[it] would be foolish to 
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the 
advance of technology.”208 Whichever test is used must be 
applied in a twenty-first century context, and in so doing, it 
must take into consideration both the actual gain and loss of 
privacy that technology has caused in our “modern” society. In 
deciding where to strike this balance, the Court simply cannot 
ignore the manner in which private companies regularly expose 
private and intimate information to the public.209 “[M]any 
people may find the tradeoff [between technology and loss of 
privacy] worthwhile”210 for purposes of security or convenience. 
Although the public may not welcome the “diminution of 
privacy that the new technology entails, they may eventually 
reconcile themselves to this development as inevitable.”211 
Would that result alter the definition of reasonableness 
  
 205 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 
U.S. 207 (1986). 
 206 Riley, 488 U.S. at 452.  
 207 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 59-62 (1762). 
 208 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001).  
 209 Referring to all the private information that one can find on the internet, 
social media, and the satellite-type of photos of neighborhoods that Apple and Google 
provide online.  
 210 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 211 Id. 
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according to the public’s expectations? When large enough 
groups manifest acceptance of the loss of privacy technology 
brings, courts would have to find, under Katz, that it is 
unreasonable for “society” to expect otherwise.212 
For example, a loss of privacy in our homes and 
backyards has already resulted from Google and Apple’s 
software applications that provide 3-D mapping of the nation’s 
metropolitan areas.213 Both companies are presently competing with 
each other to improve their mappings by taking multiple aerial 
photographs with very precise cameras.214 Indeed, politicians have 
already voiced concerns about the invasion of privacy by the 
upcoming publication of these images of people’s backyards and 
other private settings.215 If such images are available to the public 
by merely accessing Google online, how can the Court forbid the 
police from using aerial surveillance to obtain similar images?216 
  
 212 This is a necessary corollary to what one commentator suggested: “When a 
large enough group of people start to manifest subjective expectations of privacy, 
‘society [becomes] prepared to recognize [that expectation] as reasonable,’ the 
expectation becomes objective, and courts adopt it.” Joseph J. Vacek, Big Brother Will 
Soon Be Watching—Or Will He? Constitutional, Regulatory, and Operational Issues 
Surrounding the Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Law Enforcement, 85 N.D. L. 
REV. 673, 692 (2009) (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979)).  
 213 Allen, supra note 22. 
 214 See Alexei Oreskovic, Google’s, Apple’s Eyes in the Sky Draw Scrutiny, 
REUTERS (June 19, 2012, 6:33 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/19/us-
google-privacy-idUSBRE85I1QU20120619. 
 215 See Press Release, Sen. Charles E. Schumer, New Apple and Google Plans 
to Use Military-Grade Spy Planes to Map Communities and Publish Images Could 
Cause Unprecedented Invasion of Privacy (June 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.schumer.senate.gov/Newsroom/record.cfm?id=337036; see also Carl Franzen, 
Schumer: Google, Apple Moves to 3D Maps a Dimension Too Far!, TALKINGPOINTSMEMO.COM 
(June 19, 2012, 6:01 AM), http://idealab.talkingpointsmemo.com/2012/06/sen-schumer-
questions-google-and-apple-over-3d-mapping-surveys.php (discussing remarks by U.S. 
Senator Charles Schumer of New York). Schumer cited reports claiming that the technology 
used is the equivalent of military-grade technology, capable of imaging objects as small as four 
inches. Schumer Press Release, supra; see also Franzen, supra; Letter from Joe Barton & 
Edward J. Markey, U.S. Representatives, to Michael P. Huerta, Acting Adm’r of U.S. Fed. 
Aviation Admin. (Apr. 19, 2012), available at http://markey.house.gov/sites/ 
markey.house.gov/files/documents/4-19-12.Letter%20FAA%20Drones%20.pdf (“[T]here 
is also the potential for drone technology to enable invasive and pervasive surveillance 
without adequate privacy protections . . . . The surveillance power of drones is amplified 
when the information from onboard sensors is used in conjunction with facial recognition, 
behavior analysis, license plate recognition, or any other system that can identify and 
track individuals as they go about their daily lives.”); see also Pierce, supra note 2. 
 216 Of course, the police could just go to the Google website and use the images 
there instead of doing any aerial surveillance. The Google images, however, would be 
archived images, not real-time ones, but could still provide a basis for “reasonable 
suspicion” to investigate further by aerial surveillance. As one commentator 
envisioned, “[t]omorrow’s police and journalists might sit in an office or vehicle as their 
metal agents methodically search for interesting behavior to record and relay.” Calo, 
supra note 51, at 32.  
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Assuming that Congress would step in and regulate these private 
companies and statutorily limit what they can expose to the public, 
the Court would then be in a better position to strike the proper 
balance under the Fourth Amendment.217 
This part will examine how Jones’s dicta could forecast 
how the Court will respond to the use of police drones over our 
neighborhoods. As indicated above, this analysis requires a 
review of the rest of the current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence in order to project these future developments.  
Because courts have traditionally held that the degree 
of privacy protection varies in descending order from the home, 
to the curtilage, to open fields, and finally to public places,218 this 
section will consider the constitutionality of aerial drone 
surveillance in each of these four areas.219 Because Jones focused 
on surveillance conducted in the public, a review of drone 
surveillance in public places provides a logical starting point. 
B. Drone Surveillance of Public Places Subject to Constant 
Security Surveillance 
Jones’s dicta and the previous aerial surveillance cases 
offer great insight into how the Court might deal with aerial 
surveillance of public places by drones. Should any distinction 
exist between the public highways considered in Jones and 
other public places? After the events of 9/11, it would be 
difficult to successfully argue that one has any privacy interest 
  
 217 See, e.g., Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012, 
S. 3287, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/ 
z?d112:s.3287:%20(S.%203287). This bill was introduced but was not passed in the 
112th Congress by the time that it adjourned. It is likely that it will be reintroduced in 
the 113th Congress. Its terms would force federal law enforcement to obtain a warrant 
based on probable cause before using domestic drones. Id. § 3. There were some 
exceptions within this bill, such as the patrol of our national borders, when immediate 
action was necessary to prevent “imminent danger to life” and when there was a high 
risk of a terrorist attack. Id. § 4. Any evidence obtained or collected in violation of the 
Act would have been inadmissible in a criminal prosecution. Id. § 6. Any affected 
person could sue the government. Id. § 5; see also Rand Paul, Opinion, Don’t Let Drones 
Invade Our Privacy, CNN.COM (June 5, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/14/ 
opinion/rand-paul-drones/index.html. The companion bill to S. 3287 is H.R. 5925, 
introduced by Rep. Austin Scott. Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance 
Act of 2012, H.R. 5925, 112th Cong. (2012), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d112:HR05925:%20(H.R.%205925). Both bills were referred to 
committees but had received no further action when the 112th Congress adjourned.  
 218 Public highways are included by definition in public places. See infra note 
268 and accompanying text. 
 219 Similarly, one would need to separate visual surveillance from other 
advanced sense-enhanced, non-visual surveillance. This article, however, focuses only 
on visual surveillance.  
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when attending an open-air concert or a football game with 
forty-thousand or more people,220 where surveillance cameras 
are always present for security reasons. For similar reasons, 
the same result should follow with respect to other locations 
that are subject to constant monitoring by cameras, such as 
outdoor entertainment centers like Live-L.A., New York’s 
Times Square, or downtown areas of some cities. If we were 
ever to reach the point of a “surveillance state,” with cameras 
everywhere, the Court may have to reconsider whether that 
state of affairs is consistent with the principles of a “free and 
open society.”221 But we are not there yet, although the threat of 
a surveillance state does not seem that far away.222  
C. Drone Surveillance of Public Highways and Other 
Public Places Not Subject to Constant Security 
Surveillance  
In contrast to areas subject to constant surveillance by 
security cameras, Jones examined the government’s ability to 
track a person’s movements on public highways using a GPS 
device attached to the car, which revealed only the location of 
the person and not the person’s activities during these 
movements.223 Because drones could similarly track a person’s 
movements in outdoor public places, the question then becomes 
a matter of what limitations the Court will impose on location 
tracking by drones. 
The five concurring Justices224 in Jones expressed very 
clearly that they would draw the line at “prolonged” or “long-
term” tracking of a person for “most offenses.”225 It appears that 
Justice Alito used these first two terms interchangeably in his 
concurring opinion.226 Nevertheless, he never explained how 
  
 220 E.g., modern day raves, and other huge festivals, such as the “Burning 
Man” festival in the Coachella Valley in California; or Woodstock for those of us who 
are old enough to remember; or perhaps the Super Bowl; or the Olympics where there 
is always (unfortunately) a potential threat of terrorism. 
 221 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 222 A good example of how modern society may be approaching that type of 
surveillance state is found in Britain, where subways and downtown areas are 
continuously surveyed by cameras. See H.D.S. Greenway, Opinion: Conservatives Eye 
Big Brother, GLOBALPOST.COM (May 26, 2010), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/ 
worldview/100524/london-surveillance-nick-clegg-biometric-identification.  
 223 See supra Part IV. 
 224 The Justices were Alito, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor.  
 225 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J. concurring).  
 226 Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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long tracking would need to last before becoming “long-term.” 
We only know what the Jones concurrences tell us—that 
around-the-clock surveillance for twenty-eight days is “surely” 
too long.227 Neither did Justice Alito define or give examples of 
the kind of “extraordinary offense” that would permit 
“prolonged” surveillance under the Fourth Amendment.228 But, 
he obviously indicated that some situations would not require a 
warrant.229 As such, we are left to wonder what constitutes an 
“extraordinary offense,” except that it probably occurs where 
long-term surveillance would have been accomplished by 
traditional visual surveillance with police cars and aircraft.230 
Justice Alito used the “short-term” monitoring that 
occurred in Knotts as an example of permissible surveillance.231 
The Knotts Court upheld location tracking of a single trip over 
a period of a few hours in a single day, where the trip covered a 
distance of 200 miles. Just one year later, in Karo, the same 
Court upheld location monitoring involving multiple trips over 
multiple days (at least six) during a period of six months, 
where the longest trip covered a distance of 140 miles.232 At first 
glance, it would seem that the same five Justices from Jones 
would continue to uphold short-term surveillances like those in 
Knotts and Karo. However, Justice Sotomayor, in her separate 
concurring opinion, forcefully suggested that she might not 
support certain methods of short-term surveillance:  
In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique 
attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will 
require particular attention. GPS monitoring generates a precise, 
comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a 
  
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. 
 229 See id. As the Jones plurality opinion implied, this does not provide a 
bright line for the police to follow.  
 230 See id. One wonders how this would be proved. Would the trial court have 
to take testimony from experts in order to make that determination? Would it be up to 
the trial court to make that judgment by taking judicial notice of certain facts without 
any testimony? 
 231 Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 232 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708-10 (1984). The ether can with the 
beeper was initially tracked to one house, then another house two days later, then one 
day later to a storage facility, then to another storage facility, and eventually tracked 
for 140 miles to another house in another city. Id. It should be noted that the tracking 
information from location to location was permitted by the Court, but all location 
information when the can/beeper was inside any of the houses or storage structures 
was suppressed, id. at 714, even though two of the four occupants had no privacy 
interest in the house, id. at 720.  
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wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious 
and sexual associations.233 
Thus, Justice Sotomayor referred to a type of long-term 
surveillance or an accumulation of many short-term 
surveillance operations necessary to capture all of the 
delineated information. Around-the-clock surveillance of a 
person for one day would be unlikely to yield the 
comprehensive record she seemed concerned with. Justice 
Sotomayor also expressed concerns about the government 
mining a “substantial quantum of intimate information” for 
years, the potential for abuse of this type of governmental 
power, and the lack of judicial oversight over the government’s 
unfettered discretion to track whomever it chooses. She 
stressed that this type of surveillance “may ‘alter the 
relationship between citizen and government in a way that is 
inimical to democratic society.’”234 Justice Sotomayor’s 
concurrence leaves the unmistakable impression that she 
would look at the reason for aerial surveillance very carefully 
and examine what type of intimate information is being 
gathered before deciding whether even short-term (one- or two-
day) aerial surveillance violates the Fourth Amendment. Only 
time will tell. 
With respect to “long-term” or “prolonged” drone 
surveillance, Justice Sotomayor’s comments reflect a kind of 
“mosaic theory,” illustrated by the colloquialism that “the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”235 Based on the 
principle of circumstantial evidence, each piece of a mosaic may 
seem trivial or insignificant on its own, but each acquires much 
greater meaning when assembled together in a pattern with all 
the others.236 The D.C. Circuit recognized this principle in the 
Maynard case when it explained, “[w]hat may seem trivial to 
the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a 
broad view of the scene.”237 The Court went on to explain: 
  
 233 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 234 Id. at 956 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 
(7th Cir. 2011)). 
 235 See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 561 n.*, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), 
aff’d sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). It should be noted that the 
Maynard case led to the Jones opinion when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
the respondent Jones, who had been a co-defendant of Maynard in the lower court.  
 236 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 562 (distinguishing between a matter of degree 
and one of kind, or a person’s “way of life” versus a day in the life of that person).  
 237 Id. at 562 (quoting CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 178 (1985)). That Court 
pointed out that the prosecutor had used the importance of the “pattern” in his 
presentation of the case at trial. Id. at 562.  
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Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by 
short-term surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, 
what he does not do, and what he does ensemble. These types of 
information can each reveal more about a person than does any 
individual trip viewed in isolation. Repeated visits to a church, a 
gym, a bar, or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as 
does one’s not visiting any of these places over the course of a month. 
The sequence of a person’s movements can reveal still more; a single 
trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but that trip 
followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a 
different story. A person who knows all of another’s travels can 
deduce whether he is a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a 
regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an outpatient receiving 
medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political 
groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such 
facts.238 
Although not expressed in exactly the same way, these 
words likely reflect Justice Alito’s underlying concern—as 
expressed in his concurring opinion in Jones—that justified his 
finding that the around-the-clock, twenty-eight day 
surveillance was “surely” too long.239 As Justice Alito stated, 
society would not expect that law enforcement will “secretly 
monitor and catalogue every single movement of an 
individual’s car for a very long period.”240 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, implied in his 
dicta that the twenty-four hour, twenty-eight day location-
tracking surveillance could amount to the “dragnet-type law 
enforcement practices” that the Court referred to in Knotts.241 
Knotts had allowed single-trip, single-day location monitoring but 
found it unnecessary to consider a scenario that “involved twenty-
four hour surveillance of any citizen of the country.”242 It is 
difficult to determine whether Justice Scalia was broadly 
referring to around-the-clock surveillance of any specific citizen at 
any time for no reason at all, or if he was just referring to mass 
governmental surveillance of the entire population. Lower courts 
  
 238 Id. at 262 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 239 See supra note 227.  
 240 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring); see also Maynard, 615 F.3d 
at 560 (“[T]he whole of a person’s movements over the course of a month is not actually 
exposed to the public because the likelihood a stranger would observe all those 
movements is not just remote, it is essentially nil. It is one thing for a passerby to 
observe or even to follow someone during a single journey as he goes to the market or 
returns home from work. It is another thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the 
scent again the next day and the day after that, week in and week out, dogging his 
prey until he has identified all the places, people, amusements, and chores that make 
up that person’s hitherto private routine.”).  
 241 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951-52 n.6. 
 242 See id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983)).  
1316 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
have broadly interpreted this language to refer to prolonged 
surveillance of a single individual, not just mass surveillance.243  
On the other hand, Justice Scalia found the 
concurrence’s short-term–long-term dichotomy unnecessary 
and questioned its application244: Why was “a 4-week 
investigation . . . ‘surely’ too long”? Why did the concurring 
Justices decide that the Jones “drug-trafficking conspiracy 
involving substantial amounts of cash and narcotics [was] not 
an ‘extraordinary offens[e]’ which [could] permit longer 
observation”? “What of a 2-day monitoring of a suspected 
purveyor of stolen electronics? Or of a 6-month monitoring of a 
suspected terrorist?”245 Indeed, by leaving the permissible 
length of the surveillance ambiguous, the concurring Justices 
failed to provide any type of bright line for law enforcement. 
One more vote from any of the four majority Justices246 
would support short-term drone surveillance, just as the Court 
did in Knotts and Karo. We must look at other opinions for any 
clues on the subject. Justices Kennedy and Scalia, who were 
both in the Jones majority, had previously joined the majority 
opinion in Riley, which upheld the short-term aerial 
surveillance and photography of a greenhouse located within 
the curtilage of a home.247 Since the curtilage has traditionally 
received greater protection than public highways, it follows 
that one or both of these Justices would likely uphold short-
term drone surveillance of a person’s movements on public 
highways. Moreover, we also know that the Court has 
previously rejected any distinction between routine police 
surveillance and surveillance that is specifically focused on a 
particular person.248 
We can probably conclude that the current Court would 
uphold warrantless and suspicionless drone surveillance for a 
period of six days or less. Moreover, drone surveillance covering 
a distance of 200 miles or less would also be permissible. 
Twenty-eight days of around-the-clock surveillance, however, 
would likely violate the Fourth Amendment, except in the case 
of an “extraordinary” offense. As Justice Scalia pointed out, five 
Justices believed that a drug conspiracy like the one in Jones 
  
 243 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556-58; see also, e.g., United States v. Butts, 729 
F.2d 1514, 1518 n.4 (5th Cir. 1984).  
 244 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. 
 245 Id.  
 246 Justices Scalia, Roberts, Kennedy, and Thomas.  
 247 See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989).  
 248 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 n.2 (1986). 
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would not qualify as “extraordinary.” A terrorist threat could 
qualify, however, as such and thereby allow prolonged, around-
the-clock drone surveillance. Another potentially “extraordinary” 
offense could arise in an organized crime investigation where the 
investigation has been unable to infiltrate the conspiracy.249 
Except for the “extraordinary” case, however, we can rest 
assured that the Court will not allow a “surveillance state”250 
where the government constantly monitors our way of life. 
At the same time, practical issues surrounding drone 
surveillance are also likely to limit their long-term, around-the-
clock use. The FAA will predictably impose safety regulations 
requiring constant monitoring of drones for safety reasons, 
primarily to avoid interference or collisions with other aircraft 
in navigable airspace. Safety concerns would also limit the 
number of drones in any particular airspace. Because of these 
practical limitations, most investigations will likely consist of 
only one or a series of short-term surveillance operations.  
Nevertheless, the Court needs to adopt a bright-line 
rule that law enforcement can understand and use. Failure to 
do so will present an unacceptable level of uncertainty for both 
the public and the police in determining the scope of 
permissible surveillance of public places. Despite these 
challenges, the Court could logically start by excluding any 
warrantless, twenty-four hour drone surveillance lasting longer 
than a few days. A one-week limit may provide an appropriate 
demarcation, since that period of time likely will not reveal the 
kinds of repeated activities that would produce a mosaic effect, 
thereby alleviating many of the concerns shared by some of the 
Justices. A one-week limitation would also be consistent with 
Jones, Knotts, and Karo. The corollary of such a rule would be 
that the police would have to justify any warrantless surveillance 
in excess of that time by offering some other circumstances or 
through another exception to the warrant requirement. 
Next, we must consider drone surveillance of “open 
fields.” As will be seen below, a significant body of law exists 
concerning the Fourth Amendment and “open fields.” 
  
 249 Necessity could come into play, for example, by analogy to the 
requirements for obtaining a wiretap. In general, wiretap warrants are not obtainable 
unless there is a showing of necessity: i.e. that “other investigative procedures have 
been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or 
to be too dangerous.” 18 U.S.C. 2518(c). 
 250 This refers to indiscriminate mass surveillance by government as described in 
George Orwell’s novel, 1984. See ORWELL, supra note 13. I have tried throughout this article 
not to refer to this overly-mentioned novel, although its themes are indeed appropriate. 
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D. Drone Surveillance of “Open Fields” 
In the leading case of Oliver v. United States,251 the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the common law “open fields” 
doctrine. Under this doctrine, law enforcement may freely 
“enter and search a field without a warrant,”252 and thus, the 
intrusion does not constitute an “unreasonable search” under 
the Fourth Amendment.253 As the Court explained in Hester v. 
United States, “the special protection accorded by the Fourth 
Amendment to the people in their ‘persons, houses, papers, and 
effects,’ is not extended to the open fields. The distinction between 
the latter and the house is as old as the common law.”254 
Moreover, as explained by the Oliver Court, this conclusion 
derives “from the text of the Fourth Amendment and from the 
historical and contemporary understanding of its purposes . . . .”255 
An open field is simply not an “effect” of a person. 
In Oliver, the Court held that even if the defendant held 
a subjective expectation of privacy, Katz’s second prong was not 
satisfied as to activities conducted outdoors in fields.256 As the 
Court explained: 
[O]pen fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities 
that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government 
interference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in 
protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of 
crops, that occur in open fields. Moreover, as a practical matter these 
lands usually are accessible to the public and the police in ways that 
a home, an office, or commercial structure would not be. It is not 
generally true that fences or “No Trespassing” signs effectively bar 
the public from viewing open fields in rural areas. And both 
petitioner Oliver and respondent Thornton concede that the public 
and police lawfully may survey lands from the air. For these reasons, 
the asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is not an 
expectation that “society recognizes as reasonable.”257 
  
 251 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-81 (1984). The decision 
confirmed that the Katz decision had not changed the open fields doctrine.  
 252 Id. at 173 (citing Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924)). 
 253 Id. at 177. 
 254 Hester, 265 U.S. at 59. 
 255 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181. 
 256 Id. at 178. In Oliver, two officers went to the defendant’s farm, “drove past 
[his] house to a locked gate with a “No Trespassing” sign[,] . . . walked around the gate 
and along the road for several hundred yards, pass[ed] a barn and a parked 
camper[,] . . . and found a field of marihuana over a mile from [the house].” Id. at 173. 
 257 Id. at 179 (footnotes omitted). 
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An “open field” need not be “open” nor a “field,” as those terms 
are commonly used.258 The term “may include any unoccupied or 
undeveloped area outside of the curtilage,” including a “thickly 
wooded area.”259 In United States v. Dunn, the Court identified 
four factors for determining whether the area at issue qualifies 
as an open field or as part of the curtilage:  
[T]he proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether 
the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the 
nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the 
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.260  
When applying these factors, lower courts have found that even 
areas close to the home can be considered “open fields.”261 
The Supreme Court has rejected a case-by-case analysis 
in order to determine whether an open field was entitled to 
Fourth Amendment protection.262 It has also found that in the 
“open fields” context, “the common law of trespass [has] little or 
no relevance to the applicability of the Fourth Amendment.”263 
The Oliver Court held that aerial surveillance of open 
fields by the police does not violate the Fourth Amendment.264 
The Dow Court reiterated that “the public and police lawfully 
  
 258 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986) (quoting Oliver, 
466 U.S. at 180 n.11). 
 259 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.11.  
 260 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
 261 See, e.g., United States v. Boyster, 436 F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(unenclosed field located over 100 yards from a home that was not used for “any 
legitimate purpose” was not within the curtilage, where no precaution had been made 
to keep it from being visible to onlookers); United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430 (4th 
Cir. 2002) (a vegetable garden used to grow marijuana was an open field, despite its 
location fifty feet from the home and its separate enclosure by an interior fence that 
clearly demarcated it from the rest of the landscaping around the house); United States 
v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding a greenhouse that was 125 yards 
from the home, separated by hills, grass, and oak trees and with no road leading from 
the house to the greenhouse, was open to public view, and thus defendant had no 
reasonable privacy expectation); United States v. Waterfield, No. 2:05-cr-169, 2006 WL 
1645068 (S.D. Ohio June 8, 2006) (an area thirty-three feet from a home and a 
greenhouse eighty feet from that home were deemed to be open fields where the area 
next to the greenhouse was being used solely to grow marijuana); State v. Marolda, 927 
A.2d 154 (N.J. 2007) (a cornfield with marijuana growing in it was not within the 
curtilage even though the field was directly adjacent to the house; only a row of weeds 
separated the cornfield from the house).  
 262 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181-82. 
 263 Id. at 183-84. This is an interesting comment, considering that trespass 
was the trigger for the Jones majority to find a Fourth Amendment violation when the 
police planted the GPS device on the defendant’s car. The trespass on a person’s real 
property outside the curtilage is not a basis for finding a constitutional violation. In 
other words, the trespass must be on the proprietary interest enumerated in the 
Fourth Amendment—“houses, papers, and [personal] effects.” Id. at 185. 
 264 Id. at 183-84. 
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may survey lands from the air” where those lands represent 
open fields.265 Dow thus allowed aerial surveillance of an 
industrial complex by finding an analogy to open fields.266 It 
follows, then, that drone surveillance of open fields would not 
violate the Fourth Amendment any more than drone 
surveillance of public highways and other public places.267 Open 
fields and public places are thus equivalent for the purpose of 
privacy analysis,268 with the result that the length of 
permissible surveillance would not differ between them. 
Accordingly, surveillance of open fields would be equally 
limited to short-term surveillance in order to avoid the mosaic 
pattern of long-term surveillance condemned by the concurring 
opinions in Jones.  
E. Drone Surveillance of the Curtilage 
Despite the fact that the Fourth Amendment does not 
delineate the curtilage as a protected area, the Supreme Court 
has nonetheless protected that area as though it were part of 
the house itself.269 The courts have “defined the curtilage, as did 
the common law, by reference to the factors that determine 
whether an individual reasonably may expect that an area 
immediately adjacent to the home will remain private.”270 The 
Ciraolo Court further explained: 
At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the 
intimate activity associated with the “sanctity of a man’s home and 
the privacies of life.” The protection afforded the curtilage is 
essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area 
intimately linked to the home, both physically and psychologically, 
where privacy expectations are most heightened.271 
As discussed above, the four Dunn factors apply in 
determining whether an area falls within the curtilage of the 
  
 265 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986) (quoting Oliver, 
466 U.S. at 179). 
 266 Id. at 239. 
 267 The issue of “prolonged” surveillance of open fields would be the same as 
one of public places. 
 268 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 275, 282 (1983) (implicitly equating 
public highways and open fields). “[N]o such expectation of privacy extended to the 
visual observation of Petschen’s automobile arriving on his premises after leaving a 
public highway, nor to movements of objects such as the drum of chloroform outside the 
cabin in the ‘open fields.’” Id. 
 269 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. 
 270 Id. 
 271 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986) (citation omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
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home. However, the Court has cautioned against a mechanical 
application of these factors,272 pointing out that they are merely 
useful analytical tools that can help decide “whether the area 
in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it 
should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth 
Amendment protection.”273 The area’s proximity to the home 
represents only one factor in the analysis and is not by itself 
determinative. There is no specific distance at which point the 
curtilage ends.274 Moreover, with respect to fences, a fence that 
encircles the home suggests that everything located within the 
fence falls within the curtilage.275 However, interior fences that 
separate part of the yard from the home suggest that that area 
falls outside the curtilage.276 
Yet, despite the strong language associating the 
curtilage with the home, the Court has distinguished their 
relative protections in aerial surveillance cases in light of the 
fact that they simply are not the same. Indeed, the curtilage 
does not receive the same protection as the home because it 
often remains exposed to public view from the ground or from 
the air.277 As the Court has explained, “That the area is within 
the curtilage does not itself bar all police observation.”278 The 
Court has based this conclusion on the rationale of the oft-
quoted statement in Katz: “What a person knowingly exposes to 
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection.”279 
In both Ciraolo and Riley, the Court allowed the aerial 
surveillance of the curtilage of a home.280 Specifically, Ciraolo 
involved the fenced-in backyard of a home, and Riley involved a 
greenhouse located ten to twenty feet behind a mobile home.281 
Indeed, the Court in Kyllo v. United States later reiterated 
  
 272 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). 
 273 Id. For an example of a court applying the Dunn factors, see United States 
v. Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding defendant’s backyard was within 
the curtilage, where the backyard was encircled on three sides by a wire fence, was 
used as a garden with flowers and numerous small trees, and was shielded from public 
view by the house). 
 274 United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 435 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting United 
States v. Depew, 8 F.3d 1424, 1427 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 275 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301-02. 
 276 Breza, 308 F.3d at 436. 
 277 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (“[T]he technology 
enabling human flight has exposed to public view (and hence . . . to official observation) 
uncovered portions of the house and its curtilage that once were private.”). 
 278 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986). 
 279 Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)). 
 280 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989); Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 214. 
 281 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448; Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. 
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these holdings, explaining that “aerial surveillance of private 
homes and surrounding areas does not constitute a search.”282 
The Court has also emphasized that no constitutional violation 
occurs if the officer’s observations were made from a “public 
vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the 
activities clearly visible.”283 Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined the 
majority opinions in both Riley and Jones, and they remain on the 
Court that could decide the drone surveillance issue today.284 
In contrast to the small airplane used in Ciraolo, the 
Riley decision involved a helicopter hovering over a home’s 
curtilage at an altitude of four hundred feet.285 Five Justices 
agreed that no constitutional violation resulted from surveillance 
at that altitude because it was “routine” for public and private 
helicopters to fly at that altitude.286 Appropriately, the dissent 
expressed concern about the plurality’s failure to define any 
“meaningful [altitude] limit.” In the context of drones, the 
Court would likely permit the use of drones as long as they 
remain within an altitude commonly used by private or public 
planes, helicopters, or other drones in general.287  
Lower courts’ applications of the Ciraolo and Riley 
precedents may also offer insight on how the post-Jones Court 
might treat drone surveillance of the curtilage. For instance, 
lower courts have considered other factors relevant when 
applying the reasoning of Ciraolo and Riley, beyond the 
frequency of flyovers by public aircraft. In particular, courts 
have considered the “total number of instances of surveillance, 
the frequency of surveillance, the length of each surveillance, 
the altitude of the aircraft,”288 the degree of disruption of 
  
 282 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (citing Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213; Riley, 488 U.S. 445). 
 283 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 275, 282 (1983)). 
 284 Although Justices Scalia and Kennedy were on opposing sides in Kyllo, Justice 
Kennedy joined the dissenting opinion in Kyllo that would have found the monitoring of 
heat radiating from the home permissible. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 285 Riley, 488 U.S. at 448. 
 286 Id. at 450-51.  
 287 In Riley, Justice O’Connor seemed to draw the line at 400 feet but did so 
only because the record on appeal was limited to that altitude. Id. at 452 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). Her opinion should not be interpreted to signify that any surveillance at a 
lower altitude would not be permissible. 
 288 Giancola v. W. Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 550-51 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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legitimate activities on the ground,289 and whether the 
surveillance violated any flight regulations.290 
Among the lower courts, helicopter overflights at 
altitudes of 100 to 300 feet have been found permissible.291 
Courts have also allowed photographs to be taken of urban 
backyards from an altitude of 500 feet.292 The Ninth Circuit has 
aptly stated that “the Constitution does not require one to build 
an opaque bubble over himself to claim a reasonable expectation 
of privacy,” but “[w]here the bubble he builds . . . allows persons 
in navigable airspace to view his illicit activity, whatever 
expectation of privacy he has certainly is not reasonable.”293 
Drone altitude does not present the only concern, 
however. Indeed, the invasion of the “intimacy” of the curtilage 
is an even more important factor. The Court has previously 
stated that all details of the home are intimate, and that a 
distinction cannot be drawn between home activities that are 
intimate and those that are not.294 At the same time, the Court 
has treated the curtilage as an area “intimately linked to the 
home . . . .”295 For instance, the Riley plurality emphasized that 
  
 289 See Pew v. Scopino, 904 F. Supp. 18, 27 (D. Me. 1995) (violation of Fourth 
Amendment where helicopter created “excessive noise, wind, dust and disruption of 
human activities including physical injury to chattels”; an altitude of forty feet above 
roof was not within the so-called “‘safe zone’ for engine failure”; and such “lack of safety 
would . . . take these . . . flights out of navigable airspace”). 
 290 See State v. Little, 918 N.E.2d 230, 238 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (violation 
because the flight over the home and curtilage at an altitude of 100 feet was within five 
miles of an international airport where the airspace was “tightly governed by FAA 
regulations and [was] essentially a ‘no-fly’ zone”). 
 291 See, e.g., United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430 (4th Cir. 2002) (200 feet); 
Giancola, 830 F.2d at 548, 550-51 (100 feet); United States v. Young, No. 2:09-cr-00223, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15103, at *5 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 22, 2010), aff’d, No. 11-4379, 477 
Fed. App’x 976 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 463 (Oct. 9, 2012) (300 
feet); Doggett v. State, 791 So. 2d 1043, 1055-56 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).  
 292 See Henderson v. People, 879 P.2d 383, 385-86 (Colo. 1994) (police 
helicopter made four or five passes over defendant’s house and shed during a period of 
five minutes and took photographs of plastic covered shed behind the house). The 
dissent would have found a Fourth Amendment violation by applying Ciraolo and Riley 
because (1) flying four or five passes over the home and curtilage for five minutes posed 
a great degree of intrusion in a constitutionally protected area; (2) the marijuana in the 
shed was not in plain public view because of the multilayered plastic covering; and (3) 
the home was not within the path of any air traffic and had not been overflown by 
other helicopters or airplanes. Id. at 399-400; see also People v. Romo, 198 Cal. App. 3d 
581, 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (fenced-in backyard in the City of Ukiah; the court made 
it clear that it was ruling strictly on the facts of the case and that it was “not 
sanctioning aerial acrobatics such as interminable hovering, a persistent overfly, a 
treetop observation, all accompanied by the thrashing of the rotor, the clouds of dust, 
and earsplitting din”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 293 United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted). 
 294 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37-38 (2001). 
 295 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1986). 
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its decision depended in part on the fact that “no intimate 
details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were 
observed . . . .”296 Accordingly, one could conclude that the 
plurality would have likely found a constitutional violation if 
“intimate details” of the curtilage had been observed.  
Because of the Court’s respect for the “intimate details” 
of the home, it would likely impose limits on police drone 
surveillance where the use of drones constituted an exercise in 
voyeurism of “intimate” activities in a person’s backyard.297 But, 
if the Court chooses to do so by specifically limiting observation 
of only intimate activities within the curtilage, the Court would 
face the difficulty of distinguishing between intimate and non-
intimate details, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in 
Riley.298 Such a test would also create a logistical nightmare for 
officers in the field, who would have to decide on-the-fly 
whether or not their observation will capture an intimate 
detail. In addition, an intimacy-based rule would provide the 
criminal defendant with a tool to exclude any aerial surveillance 
of the curtilage by simply placing a sunbather299 in the curtilage 
next to an illegal activity. This approach would ultimately prove 
unworkable. The only remaining option would be to ban all 
warrantless drone surveillance of the curtilage,300 a result that 
would run counter to the Ciraolo–Riley–Kyllo line of cases. 
  
 296 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (emphasis added). The plurality’s 
other consideration that there was “no undue noise, and no wind, dust or threat of 
injury,” id., is not likely to come into play with drones because they are designed to 
operate in stealth mode and can avoid causing any of these disturbances. 
 297 Such activities might include, for example, consensual sexual activity, 
nude sunbathing, and the like. It will probably become very common for paparazzi to 
use drones to take nude or semi-nude pictures of celebrities in their own backyards. 
Although the latter is just an example of a possible use of drones, the Fourth 
Amendment does not apply to civilians conducting their own searches of others.  
 298 See Riley, 488 U.S. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Oliver v. 
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-82 (1984) (“Nor would a case-by-case approach 
provide a workable accommodation between the needs of law enforcement and the 
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment . . . . The lawfulness of a search would 
turn on ‘[a] highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts 
and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions[.]’ This Court 
repeatedly has acknowledged the difficulties created for courts, police, and citizens by 
an ad hoc, case-by-case definition of Fourth Amendment standards to be applied in 
differing factual circumstances. The ad hoc approach not only makes it difficult for the 
policeman to discern the scope of his authority, it also creates a danger that 
constitutional rights will be arbitrarily and inequitably enforced.” (first alteration in 
original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 299 See supra note 297 and accompanying text.  
 300 That is one of the recommendations of the ACLU. See JAY STANLEY & 
CATHERINE CRUMP, ACLU, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL SURVEILLANCE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT 15 (2011). The report 
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The technological enhancement of naked-eye perception 
has also generated concerns for the Court.301 The Dow Court 
permitted photography with a “conventional, albeit precise, 
commercial camera commonly used in mapmaking” in the 
“open fields” context of an industrial complex.302 Dow’s majority 
decision triggered a forceful dissent, which pointed out that, 
despite the majority’s conclusion to the contrary, the camera 
utilized in the case was in fact very sophisticated and could 
produce photographs that could be enhanced to show objects as 
small as half an inch.303 Some lower courts have also allowed 
aerial photography when applying the rule of Ciraolo and 
Riley, without any discussion of the sophistication of the 
cameras. For example, the courts in People v. Romo and 
Henderson v. People both upheld the use of photography of the 
curtilage from an altitude of 500 feet.304 
By contrast, the Kyllo decision addressed activities 
within the home when it prohibited the use of technologically 
enhanced thermal imaging.305 Nevertheless, both Dow and Kyllo 
referred to technology “not generally available to the public” as 
a limiting principle.306 These cases do not offer easy predictions 
about what the Court will do with drone photography of the 
curtilage. This is especially true when the technology of even 
common smartphones produces very detailed photographs from 
a distance.307 Consistent with improvements in the technology 
of today’s cameras,308 drones can obtain equally detailed 
photography from altitudes higher than in Dow.  
  
also said that drone usage should be limited to instances in which police believe they 
can collect evidence on a specific crime. Id.  
 301 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001). 
 302 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986). The majority 
did caution that it was not opening the floodgates to all photography however 
sophisticated it might be: “It may well be, as the Government concedes, that 
surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment 
not generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be 
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.” Id. at 238 (emphasis added). 
 303 Id. at 242-43 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 304 People v. Romo, 243 Cal. Rptr. 801, 805-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); Henderson 
v. People, 879 P.2d 383, 385 (Colo. 1994). 
 305 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40. 
 306 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40; see also supra note 102. 
 307 See “Dot,” Kogeto’s “professional-level panoramic” camera that is available 
for $49 for the iPhone. KOGETO, Say Hello to Dot, http://www.kogeto.com/say-hello-to-
dot (last visited Mar. 1, 2013). “Dot” is easily capable of taking 360 degree videos and in 
conjunction with an iPhone app, easily sharing those videos via social media. Id. 
 308 For example, the ARGUS-IS imaging system has a “1.8 gigapixel camera 
that the Army says can ‘track people and vehicles from altitudes above 20,000 
feet[] ’ . . . from almost 25 miles down range.” See Andrew Munchbach, US Army’s A160 
Hummingbird Drone-Copter to Don 1.8 Gigapixel Camera, ENGADGET.COM (Dec. 27, 
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Unlimited retention of photographs and videos from 
drone surveillance presents another major concern. Justice 
Sotomayor was troubled by the potential “mining” of such 
information by the government over the course of years.309 A 
statutory retention limitation would provide the best practical 
solution for this legitimate concern. For instance, Congress 
could impose a time limit for storing this information if “there 
is [no] reasonable suspicion that the images contain evidence of 
criminal activity or are relevant to an ongoing investigation or 
pending criminal trial.”310 
In conclusion, the Court will consider a number of 
factors when reviewing drone surveillance of the curtilage, 
including “the total number of instances of surveillance, the 
frequency of surveillance, the length of each surveillance, the 
altitude of the aircraft, the degree of disruption of legitimate 
activities on the ground,” the frequency commonality of public 
flights in that airspace, “and whether any flight regulations 
were violated by the surveillance.”311 The Court should, and 
probably will, permit short warrantless drone surveillance from 
an altitude within navigable airspace, so long as it does not 
create undue noise, wind, dust, or threat of injury, and does not 
interfere with the normal use of the curtilage.312 The 
permissible duration of surveillance should be much shorter for 
the curtilage than for public places, perhaps as short as one 
day, in light of the greater privacy protection that should be 
afforded to the intimacy of the curtilage. In any event, the 
Court is unlikely to condone indiscriminate surveillance of the 
curtilage for unlimited periods of time.313 The Court will likely 
allow limited photography of the curtilage with a camera 
  
2011, 11:34 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2011/12/27/us-armys-a160-hummingbird-
drone-copter-to-don-1-8-gigapixel-cam/. 
 309 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 310 See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 300, at 16. The Center for Democracy 
and Technology, a Washington based civil liberties group, has also called for such 
limits. See Somini Sengupta, Drones May Set Off a Flurry of Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 20, 2012, 1:28 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/drones-may-set-off-a-
flurry-of-lawsuits/. The ACLU report also recommends, among other things, that the 
policies and procedures for use of the drones be made public and that independent 
audits take place to check on the use of drones by the government. STANLEY & CRUMP, 
supra note 300, at 16. 
 311 See Giancola v. W. Va. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 830 F.2d 547, 550-51 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 312 The Court will not allow any “short” surveillance of the curtilage to be 
longer than what is permissible in public places. See discussion supra Part V.B. It 
should be shorter because of the greater privacy protection afforded to the curtilage.  
 313 See United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d 1282, 1289 n.5 (9th Cir. 1980). 
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containing technology commonly available to the public.314 
Indiscriminate continuous video surveillance of the curtilage, 
however, will not be acceptable because surveillance of this sort 
would bring us closer to the Orwellian state.315 
F. Drone Surveillance of the Interior of the Home 
Time and time again, the Court has taken a firm stand 
against warrantless governmental invasion of the home. 
At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man 
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable 
government intrusion. With few exceptions, the question whether a 
warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional 
must be answered no.316 
Drones such as the Nano Hummingbird are capable of 
stealthily entering the home and recording or relaying 
observations from within.317 Because Jones involved only 
surveillance on public roads, and not the search of a home, a 
review of Kyllo’s legacy will offer some insight into how the 
Court would respond to aerial surveillance of the interior of a 
home. As far as photographs of the exterior of the house, that 
issue would fit within the curtilage analysis above. It is 
abundantly clear that the Court should and will continue to be very 
protective of the interior of homes, however.318 As an initial matter, 
the Court simply will not allow any drone to physically enter the 
home based on any theory of the Fourth Amendment, including 
trespass, reasonable expectation of privacy, or any other test.  
But how will the Court resolve photography of the 
interior of the home from a drone lawfully hovering above, in 
  
 314 See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986) (As an 
alternative, the trial court could use a “naked-eye” standard and hold a hearing to 
determine what could be seen by the naked eye and compare it to the photographs; this 
could be a rather complicated and lengthy process involving expert testimony.)  
 315 See ORWELL, supra note 13; see also United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 
F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987). There is also a concern about the “concomitant chill” that 
such surveillance would have on “lawful outdoor activity.” People v. Cook, 710 P.2d 
299, 302 (Cal. 1985). This conclusion necessarily follows from the concurrences in Jones 
that would not even allow “long-term” surveillance of public highways, an area that 
enjoys less privacy protection than the curtilage 
 316 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 317 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 318 “[T]he Fourth Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house. 
That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright—which requires clear 
specification of those methods of surveillance that require a warrant.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. 
at 40 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
1328 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78:4 
the navigable airspace, without making an actual physical 
intrusion? For example, how would the Court respond to 
photographs of the home’s interior taken through open 
windows or skylights? Or how would it react to infrared 
photographs of the home by day or by night? At first glance, it 
would appear that the aerial surveillance cases would govern 
the issue of drone surveillance from above the home. In Dow, 
the Court approved of aerial photographs,319 but that decision 
offers limited insight because the Court treated the 
manufacturing complex as “more comparable to an open field” 
than to the curtilage.320 Since the home has always been 
entitled to greater protection than even the curtilage, it follows 
that one cannot infer much from Dow in the context of aerial 
photographs of the interior of the home.  
The Court is unlikely to allow resort to the plain view 
(exposed to the public) doctrine merely because windows or 
skylights are left open, since this would open the floodgates to 
invasion of the interior of the home by advancing technology. 
The Court will most likely employ a rationale similar to Kyllo 
when addressing these issues. The Jones opinions did not 
address these issues with respect to the interior of the home, 
but the Court has previously indicated that Fourth 
Amendment protection may also apply to any information 
obtained by “sense-enhancing technology” that “could not 
otherwise have otherwise been obtained without physical 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area . . . .”321 The 
issue, as the majority put it in Kyllo, boils down to the question 
of “what limits [should exist] upon th[e] power of technology to 
shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”322  
The five-to-four Kyllo majority323 held that a “search” 
occurred when the police used a relatively crude thermal-
imaging device from a public street in order to detect relative 
amounts of heat within the home.324 The imager detected that 
the “roof over the garage and a side wall of the petitioner’s 
home were relatively hot[ter than] the rest of the home and 
  
 319 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
 320 Id. at 239. 
 321 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 322 Id. 
 323 Of the 5-4 Kyllo decision, four of the majority Justices are still on the Court 
and Justice Kennedy is the only dissenting Justice remaining on the Court today. The 
Jones decision involved all five of these Justices. 
 324 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.  
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substantially warmer than neighboring homes . . . .”325 In fact, 
the thermal imager did not physically intrude into the home, 
no intimate details of the home were detected, the imager only 
passively captured heat escaping from the outside of the home, 
and there may not have been any “significant compromise of 
the homeowner’s privacy . . . .”326 Nevertheless, the majority 
declined to use those facts as the measuring tool for Fourth 
Amendment violations. Rather, the Court declared that it 
“must take the long view, from the original meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment forward.”327 
The majority proceeded to explain that obtaining “any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a 
constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—at least 
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general 
public use.”328 It rejected the dissent’s argument that the imager 
detected no information about the interior of the home except 
that which could be inferred from detecting the heat emanating 
outside of the home.329  
The majority also rejected a distinction between 
“through-the-wall surveillance” and “off-the-wall surveillance,” 
indicating that “off-the-wall” heat detection is analogous to 
other impermissible surveillances such as using a powerful 
directional microphone to pick up sound waves coming out of 
the house or a satellite to scan the house for visible light waves 
emanating from the house.330 But, as the dissent pointed out, 
there is no practical difference between measuring heat 
emanating from a house and detecting “traces of smoke, 
suspicious odors, odorless gasses, airborne particulates, or 
radioactive emissions” that could also emerge from it.331 The 
  
 325 Id. at 30. That information suggested that there was an unusual amount of 
heat within the home consistent with cultivation of marijuana, and the information 
was used, among other things, to obtain a search warrant for the home. Id. at 30. 
 326 Id. at 40. 
 327 Id. (emphasis added). The majority seemingly focused on the future 
advances of technology rather than the particular technology at hand. See id. at 51 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court is properly and commendably concerned 
about the threats to privacy that may flow from advances in the technology available to 
the law enforcement profession, it has unfortunately failed to heed the tried and true 
counsel of judicial restraint. Instead of concentrating on the rather mundane issue that 
is actually presented by the case before it, the Court has endeavored to craft an all-
encompassing rule for the future.”). 
 328 Id. at 34 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 329 Id. at 35 n.2. 
 330 Id. at 35. 
 331 Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
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dissent argued that monitoring the latter with “sense-
enhancing technology” would be permissible, “and drawing 
useful conclusions from such monitoring [would seem to be] an 
entirely reasonable public service.”332 
The Achilles heel of the Kyllo decision is that the 
majority qualified its decision by restricting only technology 
“not in general public use” at the time, without defining any 
criteria for determining when a device so qualifies.333 If this test 
were literally used as a threshold criterion, privacy would 
continue to erode as technology improves and becomes 
generally available to the public.334 
In Dow, the Court also emphasized that the type of 
camera used was a “conventional, albeit precise, commercial 
camera commonly used in mapmaking.”335 By design and 
because of technological advances over the past several years, 
however, a drone’s cameras (whether infrared or conventional) 
today would be far more technologically sophisticated than the 
mapping camera used in Dow.  
More than twenty years have elapsed since Kyllo. The 
public now commonly uses the infrared technology of thermal 
imagery in infrared cameras336 and in night goggles.337 Does that 
mean that the use of thermal imagery or night goggles to 
  
 332 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 333 Id. at 34. 
 334 As Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent: 
[T]he contours of [the majority’s] new rule are uncertain because its 
protection apparently dissipates as soon as the relevant technology is “in 
general public use.” Yet how much use is general public use is not even 
hinted at by the Court’s opinion, which makes the somewhat doubtful 
assumption that the thermal imager used in this case does not satisfy that 
criterion. . . . [T]his criterion is somewhat perverse because it seems likely 
that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of 
intrusive equipment becomes more readily available.  
Id. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 335 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). 
 336 See Penney, supra note 85, at 512 (“Since Kyllo was decided, infrared 
cameras have become more affordable, portable, and user-friendly; they are currently 
used in a wide variety of law enforcement, immigration, military, and civilian 
applications, including construction, manufacturing, testing, and inspection.”). For example, 
infrared night vision cameras are available for purchase on amazon.com for as little as $50. 
See, e.g., Camera, Photo, Video, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/Camera-Photo-Film-
Canon-Sony/b/ref=sd_allcat_p?ie=UTF8&node=502394 (search “night vision camera”) (994 
cameras available between $25 and $50 as of May 28, 2013). 
 337 For example, night goggles are available for purchase on amazon.com for 
as little as $63. See, e.g., Ultimate Arms Gear Military Binoculars, AMAZON.COM, 
http://www.amazon.com/Ultimate-Arms-Gear-Military-Binoculars/dp/B004D5AUU8/ 
ref=sr_1_3?s=electronics&ie=UTF8&qid=1362148739&sr=1-3&keywords=night+vision+b 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2013). 
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observe the home would be constitutional today? These infrared-
based cameras would likely reveal many more “intimate details” 
inside the home, even as they passively captured that 
information from outside the home without any intrusion into 
it. It is inconceivable that the Court would allow this result 
given its appropriately forceful position of protecting the 
sanctuary of the home in reliance on the paramount intent of 
the framers of the Fourth Amendment.  
The Court will simply have to retreat from its “general 
use” qualification and return to the principle that “all details 
[in the home] are intimate details, because the entire area is 
held safe from prying government eyes.”338 This is predictable 
since the Kyllo majority339 impliedly rejected other types of 
technological intrusions into the home, including “‘Handheld 
Ultrasound Through the Wall Surveillance,’ and a ‘Radar 
Flashlight’ that . . . ‘detect[s] individuals through interior 
building walls.’”340 The majority made it abundantly clear that 
it would not “leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing 
technology . . . that could discern all human activity in the 
home.”341 Indeed, it noted that “the rule we adopt must take 
account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use 
or in development.”342 The logic of that analysis would seem to 
apply to all technological devices that detect information about 
the interior of the home.343  
CONCLUSION 
Technology has outpaced Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence over the past fifty years. The judicial process 
moves much too slowly to keep up with the speed of 
technological innovation. In most cases, by the time the 
Supreme Court renders a decision on a particular technological 
device, that device is commonly used by everyone, has been 
replaced by newer technology, or has become obsolete. The 
infrared technology used by police in the Kyllo case provides a 
good example; today, it is commonly available in many cameras 
used by the public. As a result, that decision’s limiting 
  
 338 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37. 
 339 Four of the majority Justices are still on the Court today. See supra note 323. 
 340 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 n.3. 
 341 Id. at 35-36. 
 342 Id. at 36. 
 343 See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(c), at 425 (3d 
ed. 1996) (analyzing the use of binoculars, telescopes, and photo enlargement equipment).  
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principle restricting the use of technology “not generally 
available to the public” no longer serves as a meaningful limit 
on law enforcement.344 The Court will need to modify this 
approach to technology and may abandon it completely—
especially with respect to surveillance of the interior of the 
home.  
As a result of the Court’s inevitable lag behind 
technology, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence always remains 
two steps behind, making it difficult for law enforcement and 
society to know what rules apply to searches. The advent of the 
drone may be the “visceral jolt society needs to drag privacy 
law into the twenty-first century.”345 The American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) has expressed concerns that pervasive 
drone surveillance would have “chilling effects” on the public’s 
behavior, and that abuses could lead to voyeurism, 
discriminatory targeting, and institutional abuse.346 On the 
other hand, the ACLU pointed out the usefulness of drones in 
“record[ing] the activities of officials, which can serve as a 
check on [government] power.”347 
Law enforcement’s use of drones will potentially create 
unresolved issues for the next ten years or longer, until the 
proper case reaches the Supreme Court. Until then, lower 
courts will struggle to interpret the Court’s dicta in cases like 
Jones when applying the Fourth Amendment to drone 
surveillance. It would be best, as Justice Alito suggested in 
Jones, that Congress intercede by enacting appropriate 
legislation in the meantime.348 
 Drone surveillance also presents the danger of the 
accumulation or “mining” of this information by the 
government over the course of several years.349 Congress could 
provide a reasonable solution to this concern by imposing a 
time limit on the storage of this data if “there is no reasonable 
suspicion that the images contain evidence of criminal activity 
or are relevant to an ongoing investigation or pending criminal 
trial.”350 Another possible solution is to “minimiz[e] the 
collection . . . of information and data unrelated to the 
  
 344 See supra at notes 338-39. 
 345 See Calo, supra note 51, at 29.  
 346 See STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 300, at 11-12. 
 347 Id. at 12-13. 
 348 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
 349 See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 350 See supra note 310. 
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investigation of a crime.”351 The Court could later use that 
statutory limitation to help identify “what society is prepared 
to recognize as reasonable” when applying Katz’s second prong 
to drone surveillance.  
Until Congress acts, however, the Court should be able 
to continue protecting individual privacy from warrantless 
governmental drone surveillance by applying the reasonable 
expectation of privacy test, which will set the outer boundaries 
of permissible conduct under the Fourth Amendment. Under 
this analysis, the Court should prohibit surveillance of the 
interior of the home, limit monitoring of the curtilage to short 
intervals, and allow longer surveillance operations of perhaps 
one week of public places. Because drone surveillance would 
necessarily entail the use of photography and videotaping, the 
devices used should be limited to technology generally 
available to the public. Drawing such bright-line rules will 
provide a workable and predictable balance between the needs 
of law enforcement and the protection of individuals’ civil 
liberties. And the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test may 
indeed survive another round. 
  
 351 See Drone Aircraft Privacy and Transparency Act of 2012, H.R. 6676, 
112th Cong. § 339(c)(1)(A) (recently proposed legislation by Massachusetts Democrat 
Representative Edward Markey). This is analogous to minimization requirements in 
wiretap warrants. 
